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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY 
----00000----
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Respondent Utah State University ("the University") 
filed each of these five actions against the various brokers 
to recover its losses on investments in securities which this 
Court has already held were ultra vires.l/ 
Each broker subsequently filed a third-party com-
plaint against various University officials seeking indemnity. 
Four of the brokers also filed Counterclaims. 
These five lawsuits were consolidated for purposes 
of this intermediate appeal. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Two of the five brokers filed motions for change 
of venue to Salt Lake County. The other three brokers filed 
motions to dismiss for lack of if!. personam jurisdiction. 
These motions were all denied. 
All of the brokers also filed motions to dismiss 
for failure to state a claim for relief under Rule 12(b)(6). 
These were also denied. Later, all of the brokers renewed 
l/ First Equity Corporation of Florida v. Utah State Uni-
versity, 544 P.2d 887 (Utah, 1975). These brokers ap-
peared there as amici curiae. 
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their Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss but they were again 
denied. 
Meanwhile, the University filed motions for par-
tial summary judgment against each broker on the issue of 
liability alone. The Court granted these motions and en-
tered orders thereon on January 3, 1979. Simultaneously 
it entered orders dismissing the brokers' third-party actions 
and counterclaims. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
All brokers petitioned for intermediate appeal (1) 
from the orders denying their motions to dismiss for lack 
of i.!l personam jurisdiction or for change of venue, respec-
tively, and for failure to state a claim for relief, and (2) 
from the orders granting the University's motions for partial 
summary judgment and dismissing the brokers' third-party com-
plaints for indemnity and counterclaims. This Court granted 
these petitions as to the aforementioned orders. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The University's Statement of Facts falls into 
two natural divisions. The first part consists of those 
facts surrounding the issue of liability (1) as between the 
University and the brokers and (2) as between the brokers 
and the third-party defendants (University officials). 
The second part consists of those facts controlling whether 
or not i.!l personam jurisdiction is had or venue was proper. 
-2-
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The University will present a separate Statement of 
Facts dealing with jurisdiction and venue at the point 
in this brief where it addresses those issues. This 
format somewhat follows that of the brokers who defer 
their discussions of jurisdiction and venue until the 
end of their briefs. 
The University does not wish to burden the Court 
with a separate Statement of Facts on the issue of lia-
bility. The two broker briefs£/ have already devoted 30 
pages to this subject, much of which is relevant, if at 
all, to their assertion that the University officials who 
authorized the ultra vires stock purchases should bear the 
ultimate legal liability for the losses. Any rebuttal of 
these alleged facts as they might bear on the question of 
indemnity will undoubtedly come from counsel for the third-
party defendants. The University will comment here on the 
brokers' Statements of Facts only as those alleged facts re-
late to the issue of liability on the part of the brokers. That 
is to say, the University here addresses the facts only as 
they concern its motions for partial summary judgment and 
the brokers' Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss. 
£1 One brief of Bosworth, Sullivan and Company ("Bosworth") 
and the second a joint brief for the other four brokers. 
Hereafter, the briefs will be distinguished by calling 
them "Bos\'1orth's brief" and "the four brokers' brief." 
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The most important point to remember in sift-
ing through the brokers' lengthy treatment of the facts 
is that the University's motions for partial summary 
judgment are not dependent upon one or another version of 
the facts. The brokers are liable to the University as a 
matter of law even if the facts are as they assert them to 
be. The University sets forth the following comments to 
the separate statements of facts submitted by Bosworth 
and the four brokers not to preclude the existence of is-
sues of material fact--because there are none. But it does 
feel an obligation to correct factual errors and omissions 
present in the brokers' statements of facts. It will not 
submit its own Statement of Facts to do this but will 
merely comment on certain assertions made by the brokers. 
Additionally, the University will submit a short supplemental 
statement of facts in two pertinent areas whic~ the brokers 
have not treated. 
1. Reply to the Brokers' Statements of Facts 
a. The brokers frequently recommended to the 
University that it purchase a particular stock. 
The four brokers state that" ... only on a few 
occasions did any of them make recommendations that the Uni-
versity purchase any particular stock.11.~_/ This assertion 
is not only unsupported by the record references they cite 
but is flatly contradicted by the uncontroverted testimony 
ll Four brokers' brief, p.4. 
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of the University's investment official, Donald Catron. 
His sworn testimony was that every stock the University 
bought from or through Hornblower & Weeks-Hemphill Noyes, 
Inc. ("Hornblower") had been recommended to him by a 
Hornblower salesman (Hornblower, R. 152, 153). As to the 
stocks bought from or through Bear Stearns & Co. ("Bear 
Stearns"), Catron testified that a Bear Stearns salesman 
recommended to him at least thirteen stocks and also prob-
ably eight other stocks. (Bear Stears, R. 152, 153) }.../ 
b. "The primary cause" of the investment program. 
Bosworth avers categorically that the investment 
program was "prompted primarily" by (1) criticism the State 
Auditor voiced at the University for not drawing interest on 
substantial sums of operating capital it kept in non-interest 
bearing bank accounts and (2) an announced cut in legislative ap-
propriations to the University. While several University 
witnesses believed that one or both of these factors may have 
contributed to the institution of the program, the consensus 
±I Catron's affidavit concerning which brokers recommended 
what stock was prepared in opposition to motions to dis-
miss for lack of jurisdiction filed by Hornblower, Bear 
Stearns, and Sutro. Since neither Bosworth nor Merrill 
Lynch filed such motions, Catron's affidavit does not 
detail the recommendations made by those brokers. How-
ever, Catron's testimony as prepared for related federal 
court litigation was that both Bosworth and Merril Lynch 
recommended stock which the University bought. Bosworth, 
it should be noted, does not claim in the instant litiga-
tion that it did not make recommendations to purchase 
certain stock. 
-5-
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of the testimony was that the program was simply prompted 
by a general concern among University officials that these 
operating funds should be put to work (Bullen 11-12; Robins, 
19; Olsen, 22; Stockdale, 17; Harris, 10; and Catron, 60, 
62) ..§/ 
c. Influence of the Ford Foundation report. 
The five brokers suggest that the University adopted 
and incorporated into its program certain themes it took from 
a Ford Foundation report--namely, an aggressive investment 
policy and concentration of investment decision-making in 
one person. The role played by the Ford Foundation report, 
as thus claimed, is greatly exaggerated. Catron believed 
the awareness of the report was simply an additional step 
in the evolution of the program (Catron, 70). Council member 
Tibbals doubted it was the primary source (Tibbals, 27) and 
many key University personnel had no recollection of the 
"themes" the University allegedly lifted from the report or, 
indeed, of the report itself. (Harris, 17; Kumpfer, 38; 
Plowman, 24; Robins, 40-41; Snow, 13; Neuberger, 21) 
d. The ambivalence of the Institutional Council. 
Bosworth states: "Throughout 1972, the Institutional 
Council gave wholehearted support and assistance to Catron." 
References are to deponents and pages of their deposi-
tions. An index of the deponents by full name and title 
is appended hereto as Exhibit 1. 
-6-
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Bosworth then paints a picture of perfect harmony by 
drawing selectively from the record. For instance, Bosworth 
quotes Councilman Harris as saying in June that "the Uni-
versity was moving in the right direction" and as saying in 
July that the "investment staff was doing a remarkable job." 
Yet the first comment was made with specific reference to 
the staff reporting on its activities to the Council, not 
on the staff's track record in the market. And the second 
comment also related to the development of better means to 
evaluate Catron's performance (Harris, 35-36). Indeed, 
Harris was critical of the staff's investment decisions as 
early as April, 1972, and he even stated he would vote to 
discontinue the program if Catron did not become more con-
servative in his positions (Harris, 31; Deposition Ex. 39). 
Again in November, Harris felt the investment portfolio was 
in poor condition (Deposition Ex. 49). Harris was not alone 
in criticizing the program in early November. Councilman 
Hammond and even Chairman Robbins voiced criticism. Id. 
The statements of Hammond were said to typify the ambivalence 
of the entire Council in 1972. (Broadbent, 140. See also 
Hammond, 47; Tibbals, 36) 
e. The January, 1972, corporate resolution. 
The four brokers would have the Court believe that 
the Co u n c i l thoroughly di s cu s s e d, before pass i n g, the res o l u -
tion of January 20, 1972, giving Catron broad authority to 
-7-
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purchase stock. They cite the testimony of one Council-
man. They omit, however, the sworn testimony of everyone 
else present at that meeting--eleven in number--w~ich was 
that no discussion at all preceded the passage of the 
resolution. Specifically, Catron testified there was no 
discussion and he certainly would remember because he had 
drafted the resolution and knew full well that it was 
worded to give him power to sell short and buy on margin. 
(Catron, 155, 156, 261) 
f, What the brokers did to assure themselves 
that the University had power to purchase 
stock. 
Repeatedly the brokers assert that by obtaining 
from the University a written resolution reciting that it 
had power to purchase common stock, they discharged their 
duty of inquiry into the legality of accepting the Univer-
sity's purchase orders. What they do not aver they did in 
checking out the University so as to discharge this duty 
is more significant than what they allege they did do. 
Although throughout the brokers repeat that at no time did 
the University seek an opinion as to whether it could legal-
ly purchase common stock, nowhere do the brokers aver that 
one of them sought such an opinion, either from the Attorn_tl 
General or their own private counsel. Nor does any broker 
claim that the question of whether it was legal to sell s!:.Qrt 
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in the quantity involved here to a public institution was 
ever referred to top-level management within its own organi-
zation. Indeed, the only step each broker claims to have 
taken to ascertain whether the University had power to pur-
chase stock in seven-figure volumes was to obtain a written 
resol~tion from the University. In the case of at least two 
brokers, even this was not done until many months after the 
broker began to buy stock for the University. See infra, at 
pp. 65-67. Although there is some question that each broker 
ever requested or obtained such a resolution,~/ even if it 
did, this is no more than it would have required from any 
private corporate client.I/ 
2. Supplemental Statement of Facts. 
a. Margin account loans. 
Merrill Lynch correctly states that it alone of 
the brokers dealt with the University on margin. It omits 
to state that its margin dealings with the University were not 
.§/ In the case of Hornblower and Bear Stearns, the record 
does not establish that the broker ever obtained a resolu-
tion. Hornblower's affiant filed an affidavit in which he 
purported to attach a copy of the University resolution 
Hornblower supposedly received. Nothing is attached to 
either the file copy (Sutro Record, Volume 22, p. 1975) 
or the University's service copy. Bear Stearns' affiant 
also purported to attach to his affidavit a copy of the 
resolution Bear Stearns allegedly received, but the attach-
ment is missing the seal and signature which were part of 
the certified resolution. (Bear Stearns, R. 1999) 
It is a routine practice in the industry that before a 
broker does business with any corporation (or trust or 
estate) it requests a copy of the legal document empower-
ing the investment and authorizing a person(s) to make 
the investment. See e.g. Bosworth, R. 920; Merrill Lynch, 
R. 1437-1438; Bear Stearns, R. 263, 2004. 
j 
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the usual kind where the buyer puts up at the time of 
purchase only a part of the purchase price. The omitted 
facts are that on many occasions Merrill Lynch loaned to 
the University substantial sums of money, which loans it 
secured with stock it held for the University's account. 
(Exhibit 64, page 17. Exhibits are to all depositions.) 
The volumes of these loans was such that on at least three 
occasions during the life of the investment program, the 
University had an outstanding balance with Merrill Lynch 
on these loans of over $2,500,000.00 (two and one-half 
million dollars).~/ The rate of interest Merrill Lynch 
charged the University on these loans was one-quarter 
percent above the "prime rate" meaning that for much of 
the time during which the margin account was maintained, 
Merrill Lynch charged interest rates between 11.50% and 
12. 75% (Merri 11 Lynch, R, 1598-1604). Before the account 
was closed out, Merrill Lynch charged the University over 
$193,000.00 in interest alone (Merrill Lynch, R. 1488).2/ 
~I Date 
November 30, 1972 
December 31, 1972 
February 28, 1973 
Amount Due Merrill Lynch 
$3,100,000.00 
2,700,000.00 
2,700,000.00 
Source: Exhibit 64, page 17. 
~I Merrill Lynch actually realized this amount when it 
closed out the University's margin account by retaining 
stocks belonging to the University worth over $193,000. 
See the Second Count of the University's Complaint, R. _ 
2-3. The account was closed out after the Complaint ','a' 
filed. 
-10-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The only step Merrill Lynch claims it took to ascertain 
if the University had the power to borrow these sums and 
pay these rates of interest was to obtain the same type of 
corporate resolution it would require of a private car-
porate client. Indeed, the resolution upon which Merrill 
Lynch first relied in accepting business from the Univer-
sity was a Merrill Lynch stock form entitled "Corporate 
Authorization for Cash Accounts." This form resolution the 
University received from Merrill Lynch. (Merrill Lynch, 
R. 1437-1438) 
b. The publication in newspapers that the 
Attorney General concluded in December, 
1972, the investment program was illegal. 
In ordering stock from all of these brokers, the 
University specified that th~ orders be paid for "payment 
against delivery of the certificates" at one or another of 
two banks located in Logan.1.Q/ The function of these so-
called collecting banks was to receive the certificates 
from the brokers and manually deliver them to the University 
when the University's agent manually delivered a check for 
th e p u r ch a s e pr i c e to the bank ( Be a r S tea r Ii s ,- R . 2 5 2 ) . 
The brokers all knew of this arrangement, including the 
identity of the collecting banks, and agreed to it. 
1.QI The Logan branches of First Security Bank and Walker 
Bank & Trust. 
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On or about December 15, 1972, the managing 
officers of the two banks involved read newspaper ac-
counts appearing in The Salt Lake Tribune, The Deseret 
News, and The Logan Herald-Journal of an Attorney Gener-
al's opinion of that date which concluded that the Uni-
versity never had the power to purchase common stock with 
public monies and therefore its investment program was 
illegal (Bear Stearns, R. 1144-1147, 1253). Nevertheless, 
all of these brokers except Merrill Lynchll/ and Hornblower 
continued thereafter to accept and fill purchase orders on 
the University's behalf. The record contains no suggestion 
that either collecting bank communicated to any broker the 
contents of the newspaper accounts of the Attorney General's 
opinion finding the investment program illegal or that if 
there was any such communication, that any broker took any 
steps to verify the correctness of the Attorney General's 
opinion thus reported. What does appear from the record 
is that three of these brokers continued their dealings 
with the University through one of the collecting banks 
as if nothing had happened. 
3. Conclusion to the University's Statement 
of Facts. 
As will be seen, the University's motions for par· 
tial summary judgment do not depend upon whether any of the 
_!..l/ Merrill Lynch had discontinued accepting purchase 
orders from the University prior to December 15, 1972. 
for unrelated reasons. 
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above facts is contested. The University, moreover, 
does not believe that any of the facts it sets forth 
above can be contested. Assuming, arguendo, the Uni-
versity's motions for partial summary judgment fail 
because this Court finds a material contested fact to 
exist, it does not follow that the brokers' motions 
to dismiss should be granted. The record as high-
1 ighted above poses many barriers to this Court hold-
ing that under no conceivable set of facts can the 
University plead and prove a claim for relief as would 
be necessary to warrant outright dismissal. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE 
BROKERS WERE LIABLE TO THE UNIVERSITY. 
A. INTRODUCTION, 
The record in this case is voluminous.lf./ 
However, only a relatively small part of the record is 
devoted to evidentiary matters. The bulk of it consists 
of legal memoranda which for the most part plow the same 
ground. Judge Christoffersen has issued not one but four 
11.I The record contains 8604 pages excluding depositions (22) and exhibits (one box). 
-13-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
separate memoranda decisions addressing the issue of 
liability.11/ It is difficult to imagine how any trial 
court judge could have devoted more time and patience in 
considering all the brokers' motions and requests than was 
done here.l!/ No decision deserves more the indulgence on 
appeal which the law has long recognized as does Judge 
Christoffersen's ruling that the brokers are liable to the 
University under common-law principles of public contracts 
which this Court affirmed in 1975 in First Equity Corpora-
tion of Florida v. Utah State University, 544 P.2d 887 (here-
after referred to as "First Equity"). 
These cases do not present the diffuse issue, as 
the brokers state, "whether there are, under any conceivable 
state of facts, any limits on the ability of the sovereign 
to recover a g a i n s t i ts i n no cent agents the l o s s es w hi ch 
it sustains as a result of the proprietary and ultra 
vires conduct, negligence and irresponsibility of its own 
h i g h p u b l i c o ff i c e r s . " li/ T h e s e c a s e s , r a t h e r , p r e s e n t 
ll! 
l!/ 
Bear Stearns, R. 289-291, 1775-1785, 2183-2186; Merrill 
Lynch, R. 391-397. The first two were withdrawn. 
Each broker, for instance, filed two i denti cal Rule 12(b' • 
(6) motions to dismiss. Further, the trial judge deferrec 
ruling on the University's motion for partial summary jud,;· 
ment for some 30 months. Most of this delay was in re-
sponse to the brokers' urging that he should not decide , 
the summary judgment issue until after he ruled on motions I 
filed after the University's motion for partial summary. 
judgme~For a one-sided summary of the many motions an. 
other filings made in this litigation, see pp. 20-28 oft' 
four brokers' brief. This summary omits mention that the 
four brokers filed affidavits of prejudice against the~ 
judge, further delaying proceedings (e.g. Bear Stearns,c· 
4 2 3) . 
Four brokers' brief, p. 29. 
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the narrow and fairly simple issue whether the taxpayer 
or these brokers should bear the loss from ultra vires 
stock transactions where neither the University nor the 
brokers knew they were ultra vires and where neither in-
quired of their lawyers to ascertain the University's 
legal powers to purchase the securities in question. A 
related issue, present only in the Merrill Lynch case, 
is whether the University has power to borrow on margin 
and if not, does the taxpayer or the broker bear the loss 
of almost $200,000.00 in interest charged on the ultra 
vires margin account. As to the main issue, this Court 
has already all but answered it in First Equity. As to 
the Merrill Lynch margin account issue, this Court's 
reasoning in First Equity compels the conclusion that 
the margin loans were ultra vires and that the broker 
should bear the loss, being charged with knowledge of 
their unlawful nature. 
B. FIRST EQUITY SQUARELY HOLDS THESE STOCK 
PURCHASES AND MARGIN LOANS WERE ULTRA VIRES. 
In First Equity, another broker with which the 
University did business had accepted a purchase order for 
stock but had not been paid when the Attorney General in-
structed the University not to accept or pay for any more 
stock. The stock declined in value after the broker bought 
it for the University and when the University failed to 
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take delivery, the broker sought to recover the amount 
the stock declined plus brokerage commissions. Judge 
Christoffersen dismissed the suit on the University's 
motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the five brokers 
herein appeared as amicus curiae and urged unsuccessfully 
most of the grounds they advance as parties herein. In 
a unanimous opinion (Justices Henriod, Ellett, Crockett 
and Tuckett and Judge Hyde filling in for Justice Maughan) 
the Court held: 
l. "USU had no specific designated power 
from the Constitution or the Legislature 
to invest its funds in securities outside 
those declared lawful by [sec.] 33-1-1 
[Utah Code Annotated, 1953] and invest-
ments in common stock are ultra vires 
acts." 544 P. 2d 887, 892 .-- --
2. The stock purchase agreements were un-
enforceable. 
Because the Fi rs t E g u i ty op i n i on di s po s es of most of these 
brokers' arguments, a copy of the entire opinion is ap-
pended hereto for convenience as Exhibit 2. 
The brokers here urge this Court to reverse a 
decision reached unanimously less than four years ago and 
to hold that the stock transactions were lawful. They 
argue that Article X, Section 4 of the Utah Constitution 
and Section 53-32-4 (part of the "Higher Education Act of 
1969") each grants broad enough authority to cover the 
purchase of stock. In First Equity, the University devoted 
35 pages of brief to countering the same arguments based on 
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I 
........_ 
the same constitutional and statutory provisions the 
same brokers invoke here. 15 a/ In the First Equity 
opinion, Judge Hyde discussed these same arguments for 
over three pages (pp. 889-892) before rejecting them.12./ 
The key passages from his opinion of this issue are: 
15a/ 
1.§./ 
Nothing in the Constitution or 
legislative action involving USU specif-
ically grants or denies to USU the power 
to invest state appropriations in common 
stock. P. 890. 
Whether or not the grant of a "general 
control" of "all appropriations" and the 
right to "handle its own financial affairs" 
grant unrestricted power to invest is ans-
wered by The University of Utah v. Board of 
Examiners of the State of Utah [4 Utah 2d 
408, 295 P.2d 348] case. After quoting 
Sections 1 and 2 of Article X of the Con-
stitution which' mandates the Legislature 
to provide for the maintenance of the Uni-
versity of Utah and USU, the Court states: 
Would it be contended by the Uni-
versity that under Article X, Section 
1, it might compel the Legislature to 
appropriate money the University con-
siders essential? Is it contended 
Those briefs (Respondent's Brief and Respondent's 
Reply Brief) are now included in Volume 904, Utah 
Supreme Court Abstracts and Briefs. 
A careful comparison of the opinion and the Univer-
sity's two briefs in First Equity indicates that Judge 
Hyde read the briefs with some care and used substan-
tial parts of them in his opinion. 
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that the demands of the University 
are not subject to constitutional 
debt limits? If so, respondent would 
have the power to destroy the solvency 
of the State and all other institutions 
by demands beyond the power of the State 
to meet. 
The Court then quotes in full Sections 5 
and 7 of Article X of the Constitution, which 
provide, respectively, that the proceeds of 
the sale of land reserved by Congress for the 
University of Utah shall constitute permanent 
funds of the State, and that all public school 
funds shall be guaranteed by the State against 
loss or diversion. Then the Court concludes: 
It is inconceivable that the framers of 
the Constitution in light of the provi-
sions of Sections 1, 5 and 7 of Article 
X and the provisions as to debt limita-
tions intended to place the University 
above the only controls available for 
the people of this State as to the prop-
erty, management and government of the 
University. We are unable to reconcile 
respondent's position that the University 
has a blank check as to all its funds 
with no pre-audit and no restraint under 
the provisions of the Constitution re-
quiring the State to safely invest and 
hold the dedicated funds and making the 
State guarantor of the public school 
funds against loss or diversion. To 
hold that respondent has free and un-
controlled custody and use of its prop-
erty and funds while making the State 
guarantee said funds against loss or 
diversion is inconceivable. We believe 
the framers of the Constitution intended 
no such result. (emphasis added) 
[1] As stated above, it is clear since 
The University of Utah v. Board of Examiners 
of the State of Utah (supra) case that USU 
is clearly a state institution and that it 
holds property in trust for the State of Utah 
and is subject to the laws of the State en-
acted relating to its purposes and government. 
p. 890 
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This Court has held that municipal 
powers cannot lightly be inferred by 
implication. P. 891. 
A general grant to handle its finan-
cial affairs does not give authority to 
invest in common stock. The power to 
invest is not granted in the absence of 
legislation to the contrary but the re-
verse is true. It depends upon a specif-
ic authorizing grant of such power. P. 891. 
The opinion then discusses Section 33-1-1, the "only 
specific Utah statute on the subject of investment," and 
concludes that it does not empower Utah public bodies to 
invest in common stock. 
There is no need to canvass the law so recently 
and ably discussed in First.Equity. These stock purchase 
transactions are clearly ultra vires, being the same trans-
actions as this Court has already ruled upon. 
While First Equity was not concerned with margin 
loans, its reasoning disposes also of Merrill Lynch's con-
tention that its loans to the University were lawful. In-
deed, there is absolutely no plausible argument based on 
any specific statute for the legality of these loans. 
Merrill Lynch does not cite any statute to justify the 
loans; the four brokers' brief on this point (pp. 55-58) 
only argues for the legality of the stock purchases. 
It is obvious that these loans were not of the 
kind involved in the university bond issues described in 
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Spence v. Utah State Agricultural College, 123 Utah 182, 
257 P.2d 367 (1953). If the University could borrow mil-
lions without limitation, and pile up interest charges in 
six figures, as it did here, why could it not borrow hundreds 
of millions and run up interest charges in the millions? As 
First Equity discussed, all public school funds are to be 
guaranteed against loss or diversion by the State. To quote 
from The University of Utah v. Board of Examiners of the State 
of Utah, ~· as reiterated in First Equity, the University 
would "have the power to destroy the solvency of the State and 
all other institutions by demands beyond the power of the State 
to meet" if it could pay high interest rates to borrow in an 
unlimited amount and have the State be obligated to guarantee 
payment of principal and interest. 
The sections of the Code cited to support the stock 
purchases as incidental to the University's powers to invest 
in certain instruments obviously do not apply here since these 
loans clearly were not investments. Merrill Lynch's position 
that these loans were lawful is even less tenable than the 
brokers' argument that the stock purchases were legal. 
C. THE LOGIC OF FIRST EQUITY COMPELS THE 
RESULT THAT THE BROKERS BEAR THESE LOSSES. 
This was the nub of Judge Christoffersen's two 
memoranda decisions.lZ/ The University's position is nowhere 
better stated than in those decisions. In his decision of 
July 6, 1977, denying the brokers' first set of Rule 12(b) 
11.I See footnote 13, ~· 
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(6) motions to dismiss, he stated: 
the broker-dealers are not 
innocent as opposed to those individuals 
they dealt with at the University. (T]hey too 
are ~harged with the knowledge that the Uni-
versity could not deal in common stocks, 
yet they entered into the transactions as-
sumingly for profits of their own and now 
seek to avoid the responsibility for them. 
The question still remains where 
the University does not have to pay for 
commissions unpaid related to the trans-
actions, can they recover those they 
have already paid. This is not a trans-
action that involves just the hierarchy 
of Utah State University and the broker-
dealers but involves public funds and 
monies placed there by the taxpayers. 
To hold that the public funds could not 
be recovered could further encourage 
unauthorized expenditure of public funds 
and would be no deterrent to unauthorized 
expenditures if there could be no recovery, 
since those dealing with public entities 
in ultra vires acts would know that they 
cou~terinto such transactions, for 
their profit, of unauthorized expenditures 
of public funds knowing there could never 
be any action agaiAst them for recovery 
of those public funds, no matter how il-
legal or unauthorized the expenditure. 
This Court does not feel this was 
the intent of either the Legislature or 
the Constitution to expose the public 
funds to such disbursement even though 
the disbursement was made by persons in 
an authorized position but where the trans-
action itself was unauthorized or l}l~gal. 
Therefore, the motions are denied.~-a/ 
Later, in his decision granting the University's 
motions for partial summary judgment, the trial judge 
stated emphatically: 
This Court has in other cases involving 
USU and other brokers and in decisions involv-
ing these other issues in connection with these 
defendants, held and indicated the contracts 
l?a/ Merri 11, R. 396-397. 
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for purchase of stocks were illegal, that 
the brokers had notice or were required by 
law to know that the transactions they were 
entering were illegal. The defendant bro-
kers argue that even if they were to assume 
this to be so USU is equally to blame and 
is equally to be charged with the knowledge 
of the transaction since Catron was the 
agent of the University and was given 
specific authority by the board to enter 
into such contracts. 
This Court has repeatedly stated 
and now holds that in this case there are 
more than two parties interested in this 
matter and who have financial interest 
other than Utah State and the brokers and 
that is the taxpayers whose money was used 
in these transactions and whose money was 
lost by reason of these transact~ons. 
This Court feels that the brokers cannot 
escape liability for their illegal acts, 
acts with which they are charged legally 
with knowing to be illegal by saying of-
ficials of Utah State also knew this and 
were charged with this knowledge. The 
Court feels where a governmental entity 
is involved and the parties are charged 
with the legal use of public funds that 
the other illegal party ca"not escape 
liability by saying the specific party 
we dealt with does not come into this 
matter with clean hands either. 
The Court would, therefore, grant 
the motion of USU for partial summary judg-
ment and would deny the second motion to 
dismiss by the brokers. (Bear Stearns, R. 2185-
2186.} 
D. THE OVERWHELMING WEIGHT OF AUTHORITY FROM 
OTHER JURISDICTIONS AND COMMENTATORS SUP-
PORTS THE TRIAL COURT'S HOLDING. 
Although Judge Christoffersen cited no case law 
or other authority for his ruling, he was aware of over 80 
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cases from other jurisdictions (30 decided within the 
last 30 years) which the University had collected and 
repeatedly relied upon. Rather than burden the Court 
with a complete list of those cases (which the Court 
can find in the record, e.g. Bear Stearns, R. 689-719), 
the University will here discuss only some of them . ..u!./ 
1. Rationale of allowing recovery. 
Various reasons have been set forth by the 
courts in the below cases for the rule allowing recovery 
where the contract in question was wholly ultra vires, 
i.e. wholly outside the power of the public body to 
make.11/ These reasons may be synthesized under three 
headings: 
(a) Public policy requires courts to allow 
recovery because a third-party contractor, who is deemed 
to know the limitations of power of a public entity, would 
..u!_/ 
1,11 
The four brokers claim they "distinguished" the 
University's cases (Bear Stearns, R. 2005, at 2062). 
Their claimed review of "most" of the University's 
cases did not even address 60 such cases. See the 
University's rebuttal to the brokers' "distinguish-
ing" of its cases in its Joint Reply Memorandum 
Supporting Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, 
pp. 22-27 (e.g. Sutro, R. 2027-2033). 
The result is sometimes different where the body 
has power to make a contract but does not follow 
the required procedure in making it. 
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otherwise be able to enter a contract with that entity 
which is beyond those limitations, receive payment, and 
the taxpayer would be left to pay for the unauthorized 
expenditure. (See the cases from California, New York 
and Florida discussed below.) 
(b) Such a contract not only should not be 
made but it cannot be made, and the agent making it on 
behalf of the entity does not thereby bind his principal 
notwithstanding he may be unaware of the lack of power 
in the entity. For cases reflecting this rationale, 
see Stone v. United States, 286 F.2d 56, 58 (8th Cir., 
1961); County of St. Francis v. Brookshire, 302 S.W.2d 1, 
5, (Mo. 1957); and Fulk v. School District No. 8 of 
Lancaster County, 53 ILW.2d 56, 63 (Neb. 1952). 19 a/ 
(c) As a matter of contract law, although in 
the case of private individuals money paid out under a 
mistake of law (as opposed to a mistake of fact) is not 
generally recoverable, an exception exists in the case of 
payment by public entities made under a mistake of law. 
The leading case espousing this rationale is State v. 
Axtell, discussed under Section 3, infra. Other cases 
following this reasoning are numbered in Section 4 as 
cases 1, 8, 9, 10, 11, 18, and 27. 
19a/ See also Norfolk County v. Cook, infra, at p. 25. 
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2. California cases. 
The California Courts have repeatedly held 
that public monies expended pursuant to unlawful contracts 
may be recovered. Miller v. McKinnon, 124 P.2d 34 (Cal. 
1942). Plaintiff taxpayer sued to recover money already 
paid a contractor for work done pursuant to a contract 
which had been let without following bidding procedures. 
After dismissing the argument that it is harsh and unfair 
to force repayment when the public body has already re-
ceived what it paid for and cannot restore it, the Court 
stated at p. 37; 
(3) Persons dealing with the public 
agency are presumed to know the law with 
respect to the requirement of competitive 
bidding and act at their peril [citing 
cases]. 
(4) With the principles being as 
above stated, it inescapably follows that 
a right of action exists to recover moneys 
paid to a contractor for work and materials 
furnished the public agency where they were 
furnished in contravention of a statute re-
quiring competitive bidding. If, as we have 
seen, the contract is absolutely void as 
being in excess of the agency's power, the 
contractor acts at his peril, and he cannot 
recover payment for the work performed, it 
necessarily follows that any payments made 
to him for the work are illegally made and 
may be recovered. If that were not true, 
the competitive bidding requirement would 
be completely nullified because the agency 
could have the work done, pay the charges 
therefor, and the taxpayers would be help-
less to compel observances of the law. The 
only event preventing that result in any case 
would be whether some taxpayer acted soon 
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enough to forestall the payment by in-
junction proceedings. The effective 
operation and enforcement of the public 
policy declared in the statute cannot 
be dependent upon such an uncertainty. 
The temptation on the part of officials 
and the persons contracting with the 
agency desiring to evade the law would 
be to act quickly and secretly in order 
that the taxpayers would be caught off 
guard. Such a condition is manifestly 
undesirable. 
In People v. Union Oil Company of California, 
310 P.2d 409, 413 (Cal., 1957), the Court said: 
While as a general rule a mistake 
of law is of no legal consequences ... 
it has been said that the recovery of pub-
lic moneys paid out through mistake by the 
state or an agency of government should be 
permitted "in many instances where, if paid 
out by a private corporation [they) could 
not be." Aebli v. Board of Education, 62 
Cal. App.2d 706, 725, 145 P.2d 601, 610; 
see also 70 C.J.S. Payment § 156, p. 365. 
In the Aebli case, suora, a 1944 decision of the California 
Court of Appeals, the Court quotes the following reason for 
this rule from Norfolk County v. Cook, 97 N.E. 778 (Mass. 
1912): 
An individual is dealing with his 
own money .... public officers are deal-
ing with money which is not their own and 
over which their powers are subject to well 
known limitations ... when they act beyond 
their powers they do not bind their prin-
cipals. The payment of this money in this 
case was not the act of the county, but 
simply the unauthorized act of a public 
officer. It was not the voluntary payment 
of money by the owner, but by one who had 
no beneficial interest in it .... 
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See also, Los Angeles City School District v. Landier, 
2 Cal. Reptr. 662, 666-667 (Ct. App. 1960) and Greer 
v. Hitchcock, 76 Cal. Rptr. 376, 378 (Ct. App. 1969), 
affirming that Miller v. McKinnon, ~. is still good 
law. 
3. State v. Axtell--A leading case allowing 
recovery under the rule that public bodies 
can recover monies paid out under a mis-
take of law. 
In State v. Axtell, 393 P.2d 451, 454 (N.Mex. 
S.Ct. 1964), the Court allJwed the state to recover 
monies paid out unconstitutionally. In doing so, it 
exhaustively canvassed the question whether monies paid 
out by public entities under a mistake of law could be 
recovered. The Court stated: 
Neither they nor the appellees 
knew at the time the funds were expended 
that the payment was illegal--this knowl-
edge had to await the decision of this 
court in Hannah. 
The rule simply stated is: 
"Payment of public money by 
officials made under a mistake 
of law may be recovered." 
5 Williston on Contracts, rev. ed.[1937] 
§ 1590 [p. 4436]. Such a rule, although 
differently worded, is followed in prac-
tically every jurisdiction throughout the 
country. See 3 Corbin on Contracts, § 617, 
and cases cited in footnote 65; and Restate-
ment of the Law, Restitution, § 46(a), and 
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cases cited in the reporter's notes. 
It is of interest to note that approx-
imately forty courts of last resort fol-
low the rule, although in some cases it 
is not always applied under all circum-
stances. In at least nine jurisdictions, 
which had initially followed the rule of 
no recovery under mistake of law, the 
courts have found it necessary to either 
directly or impliedly overrule earlier 
decisions, in order that a state or sub-
division may recover funds paid under 
mistake of law (emphasis added). 
The Court in Axtell was faced with the additional ques-
tion of whether the state could recover monies expended 
pursuant to a seemingly valid legislative enactment 
which was later declared unconstitutional. In holding 
that this did not defeat the right of the state to re-
cover, the Court emphasized (at p. 457) that although 
the good faith of the parties was not questioned, the 
statute "unfortunately" was unconstitutional and the 
payments therefore were illegal. 
In these cases, the University did not pay 
out monies pursuant to a seemingly valid statute which 
was later struck down. The reasoning of Axtell would 
therefore apply with greater force to these cases. 
4. New York cases. 
A recent case involving the question of whether 
public entities can recover monies paid out illegally by 
a public entity notwithstanding that substantial benefits 
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were conferred on the entity which cannot be returned 
is Gerzof v. Sweeney, 264 N.Y.S.2d 376 (N.Y.Ct.App., 
1965), 276 N.Y.S.2d 485 (N.Y.S.Ct.,1966), 286 N.Y.S.2d 
392 (N.Y.S. Ct., 1968), modified at 289 N.Y.S.2d 392, 
and 239 N.E,2d 521 (N.Y.Ct.App., 1968). In that case, 
a contractor installed a generator for the Village of 
Freeport pursuant to a contract held to have been award-
ed in violation of state bidding law. In the fourth 
phase of the case, the Court said (276 N.Y.S.2d 485, 
489): 
Permitting the Village to retain 
the generator and directing repayment of 
the sums illegally paid is indeed a harsh 
result. Nevertheless the law is clear, 
and to permit literal application of 
equitable principles in this case would 
invite the e~ils the statute is obviously 
intended to prevent. 
In the final phase of the litigation, the Court of Ap-
peals was "concerned only with the question of remedies" 
(239 N.E.2d 521, 522). In holding that the generator 
was nonreturnable and the contractor should be required 
to pay the Village the difference between the price of 
the generator and a competitor's bid for a smaller gen-
erator, plus the difference in installation costs and 
interest, the Court said, at pp. 523-524: 
If we were to sanction payment of 
the fair and reasonable value of items sold 
in contravention of the bidding requirements, 
the vendor, having little to lose, would be 
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encouraged to risk evasion of the 
statute; by the same token, if public 
officials were free to make such pay-
ments, the way would be open to them 
to accomplish by indirection what they 
are forbidden to do directly. [Citing 
authorities.] 
... There should, logically, be 
no difference in ultimate consequence 
between the case where a vendor has been 
paid under an illegal contract and the 
one in which payment has not yet been 
made. If, in the latter case, he is de-
nied payment, he should, in the former, 
be required to return the payment unlaw-
fully received-and he should not be ex-
cused from making this refund simply be-
cause it is impossible or intJlerably 
difficult for the municipality to restore 
the illegally purchased goods or services 
to the vendor. In neither case can the 
usual concern of equity to prevent unjust 
enrichment be allowed to overcome and ex-
tinguish the special safeguards which the 
Legislature has provided for the public 
treasury . 
. . . Only thus can the practical 
effectiveness and vigor of the bidding 
statutes be maintained. 
Other New York cases have followed Gerzof. 
S.T. Grand, Inc. v. City of New York, 298 N.E.2d 105, 
107-108 (N.Y.Ct.App., 1973); Cupid Diaper Service v. 
New York City Health and Hospitals, 381 N.Y.S.2d 996, 
999 (N.Y. S.Ct., 1976); Lance Investigation Service v. 
City of New York, 387 N.Y.S.2d 32 (N.Y.S.Ct., 1976). 
Federal cases applying New York law to this effect are 
Board of Education Central School District No. 2 etc. v. 
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Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 453 F.2d 264, 268 (2d 
Cir., 1971) and Fabrizio & Martin, Inc. v. Board of 
Education Central School District No. 2, etc., 290 F. 
Supp. 945, 956 (S.D. N.Y. 1968). 
5. Recent cases from other jurisdictions. 
Many other cases decided since 1950 hold that 
a public body may recover payments made ultra vires. 
Federal 
5th C1rcuit: 
1. J.W. Bateson Co. v. United States, 
308 F.2d 510, 515 (1962) 
8th Circuit: 
2. Stone v. United States, 286 F.2d 56, 
58 (1961) 
Alabama: 
3. State v. Fourth National Bank of Columbus, 
~. 117 So.2d 145, 154 (1959) 
Alaska: 
4. Reliance Insurance Co. v. Alaska State 
Housing Authority, 323 F.Supp. 1370, 
1373 (D.Alas. 1971) 
Arkansas: 
5. Mackey v. McDonald, 504 S.W.2d 726, 732-
733 (1974) 
Florida: 
6. Mayes Printing Co. v. Flowers, 154 So.2d 
859, 865 (Ct.App. 1963) 
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Georgia: 
7. Polk County v. Lincoln National Life, 
262 F.2d 846, head note 3 and 847 
(5th Cir., 1959) 
Idaho: 
8 . St ate v . McCarty , 2 7 9 P . 2 d 8 7 9 , 8 8 1 ( 19 5 5) 
Iowa: 
9. National Fire Insurance Co. v. Butler, 
152 N.W.2d 271, 273 (1967) 
Maryland: 
10. State v. Rucker, 126 A.2d 846, 850 (Ct. 
App. 1956) 
Massachusetts: 
11. Dunne v. City of Fall River, 104 N.E.2d 
157' 160 ( 1952) 
Minnesota: 
12. City of St. Paul v. Dual Parking Meter Co., 
39 N.W.2d 174, 181 (1949) 
Mississippi: 
13. J.S. Love Co. v. Town of Carthage, 
65 So.2d 568, 573-574 (1953) 
Missouri: 
14. Count of St. Francis v. Brookshire, 
302 S.W.2d 1, 5 1957 
15. City-Wide Asphalt Co. v. City of Indepen-
dence, 546 S.W.2d 493, 497 (Ct.App. 1976) 
Nebraska: 
16. Fulk v. School District No. 8 of Lancaster 
County, 53 N.W.2d 56, 63 (1952) 
17. Cosentino v. Carver-Greenfield Cor . , 433 
F.2d 1274, 1276 8th Cir., 1970 
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New Hampshire: 
18. Opinion of the Justices, 175 A.2d 
396, 398 (1961) 
Ne~1 Jersey: 
19. Thornton v. Village of Ridgewood, 
111 A.2d 899, 904 (1955) 
20. Shebell v. Strelechi, 249 A.2d 10, 13 
(Superior Ct., 1969) 
North Carolina: 
21. Rider v. Lenoir County, 78 S.E.2d 745, 
748 (1953) 
22. Horner v. Chamber of Commerce of City 
of Burlington, 72 S.E.2d 21 (1952) 
South Carolina: 
23. Town of Beenettsville v. Bledsoe, 845 E.2d 
554, 556 (1954). 
South Dakota: 
24. Hauck v. Bull, 110 N.W.2d 506, 508 (1961) 
25. Carlson v. City of Faith, 67 N.W.2d 149, 
151 (1954) 
Tennessee: 
26. Crass v. Walls, 259 S.W.2d 670, 673 (Tenn. 
Ct. App., 1953) 
Washington: 
27. State v. Continental Baking Co., 431 P.2d 
993' 996 ( 1967) 
Wisconsin: 
28. Leuch v. Egelhoff, 38 N.W.2d 1, 2-3 (1949) 
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E. THAT THE BROKERS IN MANY CASES WERE 
ACTING ONLY AS AGENTS FOR THE SELLERS 
IS NO BAR TO THESE ACTIONS. 
Two of the brokers apparently never acted as 
principals in these transactions--that is, they never 
sold securities to the University out of their own 
inventories but always acted as brokers in putting the 
University together with willing sellers. All of the 
other brokers admit they were direct sellers in at least 
some transactions. Thus, the argument they raise con-
cededly only applies to some of the University's pur-
chases and even if successful, would not defeat these 
motions for partial summary judgment insofar as they 
embrace the direct sales by the brokers. Moreover, the 
University in any event can recover the commissions it 
paid directly to the brokers, which alone total in six 
• figures. The brokers appear to concede this point. By 
doing so, they concede that this defense does not defeat 
a motion for judgment as to liability alone which by 
definition does not go to damages. 
But even as to the transactions these appellants 
merely brokered, their contention must fail. Like most 
of their other defenses, this has been weighed and found 
wanting in First Equity. The Court's reasoning there is 
dispositive here: 
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Although this action was commenced 
and argued at the lower Court on the basis 
of breach of contract between the parties, 
plaintiff and Amici now contend that in 
any event plaintiff should be entitled to 
recover because they were acting as the 
agents of USU. Under the theory of agency, 
one of two things would occur; either the 
loss would have to be absorbed by the seller 
of the stocks who doesn't have the faintest 
idea that his stock is being purchased by a 
public corporation or the rules denying re-
covery on ultra vires contracts of a public 
corporation would be meaningless. Substan-
tive rights involving public funds should 
not be determined by the custom of the se-
curities industry in designating the broker 
as the agent of the buyer or as agent of the 
buyer and seller. The rules denying recovery 
of an ultra vires contract are based on the 
theory that the party actually dealing with 
the public entity is charged with the knowl-
edge that the contract is ultra vires and 
unenforceable, and in this case the plain-
tiff is the party actually dealing with the 
public entity and this action was filed on 
that basis--that USU was a customer of First 
Equity. Pp. 892-893. 
As already noted, the Amici just referred to 
were the brokers herein. 
Bosworth attempts to distinguish First Equity 
on this point on the ground the broker there sought ~-
forcement of the ultra vires contract, relying ostrich-
like on the technical meaning of the language employed. 
But it gives no reason why the public interest underlying 
the result in First Equity does not compel the same result 
here. 
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None of the brokers' cases cited on this 
point help them since they all involve valid contracts 
and none involves the public policy considerations ex-
isting where a public body pays out tax monies under 
an ultra vires contract. 
F. NEITHER THE SO-CALLED ILLEGALITY OF 
THESE CONTRACTS NOR THE FACT THAT PAY-
MENT WAS MADE UNDER A MISTAKE OF LAW 
PRECLUDE THESE SUITS 
The brokers urge that the University should 
not be aliowed to recover here because the "contracts" 
were executed even though they might be ultra vires. 
This part of their memorandum encompasses two distinct 
arguments: (1) these contracts were not only ultra vires 
and therefore void, they were also illegal so that the 
law will not assist the University in recovering its 
monies; and (2) the University paid monies voluntarily 
under a mistake of law for which there is no right of 
recovery. Both arguments are fallacious: 
1. Assuming, arguendo, these contracts were 
illegal as opposed to being ultra vires, 
the rule contended for does not apply to 
the University. 
Nowhere did the Utah Supreme Court in First 
Equity intimate that contracts to buy common stock were 
anything but ultra vires. The rule that payments made 
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under contracts which are illegal may not ordinarily 
be recovered where the parties are 2..!J. ~ delicto has 
not been said to apply to ultra vires contracts. More-
over, the "rule" has limited validity even as applied 
to illegal contracts. As stated in McCormick v. Life 
Insurance Corporation of America, 6 U.2d 170, 308 P.2d 
949, 951 (1957): 
... The Courts have carved out 
so many exceptions to the so-called "general 
rule" that it can hardly be properly so de-
nominated. 
See also Second Russian Ins. Co. v. Miller, 268 U.S. 552, 
562, 69 L. Ed. 1089, 1092 ( 1925). One of the many excep-
tions is stated in Corpus Juris Secundum as follows: 
The ordinary rule governing indi-
viduals, that when a contract against 
public policy is executed, the law will 
leave the parties where it finds them, does 
not apply where the public is one of the 
parties. 17 C.J.S. Contracts, 1197 
The same proposition is formulated in 2d American Juris-
prudence, Contracts, Paragraph 225: 
. where a state is an inter-
ested party to an action, the contribut-
ing guilt of the parties to the suit will 
not operate as a bar to the granting of 
relief to the state. 
See also Gwinnett County v. Archer, 118 S.E.2d 97, 101 
(Ga. App. 1960); City of Philadelphia v. Rosin's Parking 
Lot, 56 A.2d 207 (Penn. 1948); State v. Weatherby, 129 
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S.W.2d 887, 892 (Mo. 1939); Burke v. Wheeler County, 
187 S.E. 246, 249 (Ga. App. 1936); Restatement, Con-
tracts, Section 601, p. 1116 (1932), especially il-
lustration 4. It can hardly be questioned that the 
plaintiff herein is suing on behalf of "the public," 
being the State of Utah, First Equity, p. 890. Indeed, 
this is conceded by the brokers. It follows that the 
University is not governed by the so-called "rule" 
urged here. 
Because this Court in First Equity was not 
dealing with an illegal contract, the brokers' oft-re-
peated argument that the rationale behind the First 
Equity opinion precludes recovery in these cases is 
specious. The ground on which this Court decided First 
Equity was clearly not that it wished to leave the par-
ties to an illegal contract where it found them but 
rather because it wished to safeguard public monies. 
That same ground dictates that recovery be allowed in 
these cases. 
2. The rule barring recovery of money 
voluntarily paid under a mistake of 
law does not apply to payments made 
by the State. 
The brokers rely on Section 45 of the Restate-
ment of the Law of Restitution which, "[e]xcept as other-
wise stated in Sections 46-55" bars recovery of monies 
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paid voluntarily under a mistake of law. Perhaps 
they did not read the noted exceptions to the rule. 
The first such exception found in Rule 46 states: 
A person who has conferred a 
benefit upon another because of an er-
roneous belief induced by a mistake of 
law that he is under a duty so to do, 
is entitled to restitution as though 
the mistake were one of fact if: 
(a) the benefit was con-
ferred by a State or subdivision 
thereof .... 
Of the rule which governs these lawsuits, the Court 
said in State v. Axtell, 393 P.2d 451, 454 (N.Mex. 1964): 
The rule simply stated is: 
"Payments of public money by officials 
made under a mistake of law may be re-
covered." 
5 Williston on Contracts, rev. ed., Section 
1590. Such a rule, although differently 
worded, is followed in practically every 
jurisdiction throughout the country. See 
3 Corbin on Contracts, Section 617, and cases 
cited in footnote 65; and Restatement of the 
Law, Restitution, Section 46(a) and cases 
cited in the reporters notes. (Emphasis added.) 
See the more extensive discussion of State v. Axtell, 
~. p.26. As that Court noted, some 40 states follow 
the aforestated rule. 
3. The brokers' reliance on two Utah cases 
involving the Millard County School Dis-
trict is misplaced. 
After complaining that the University's callee-
tion of cases referred to in D, ~· consists mostly 
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of decisions earlier than 1950, the brokers place 
considerable emphasis on two cases out of Millard 
County decided in 1919 and 1932, respectively. These 
cases, they say, support their contrived theory that 
this Court's logic in First Equity would lead it to 
deny recovery here by leaving the parties where it 
found them. As to the 1919 case, Judge Christoffersen 
disposed of it as follows: 
The defendants not only rely on the 
First Equity case but also other Utah cases 
and more specifically Moe v. Millard County 
School District, 170 P. 980. In this case, 
Moe entered into contracts with the school 
district for purchase and installation of 
heating and plumbing materials for which 
partial payment was made; Moe sued for the 
remaining purchase price. The district had 
exceeded the debt limitation of the state 
constitution and had not obtained a vote of 
the taxpayers required to exceed the limita-
tion formula. Moe conceded he could not re-
cover upon the contracts nor upon quantum 
meruit but the defendants here argue that 
because Moe was not required to return the 
partial payment this is authority that Utah 
State cannot recover payments made to the 
brokers on commissions or other losses. 
However, this would be a case where the 
school would enjoy the benefits of the 
plumbing and heating materials installed 
plus a return of their partial payment which 
is not the case here. The University does 
not seek to retain the stocks and receive 
back their payments for the same nor do they 
seek to retain the profits they may have made 
in stock transactions and recover only their 
losses, that any monies received by way of 
the contract would be offset against the 
losses. (Memorandum decision denying brokers' 
first round of Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dis-
miss, July 6, 1977, Merrill Lynch, R. 395) 
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Although Judge Christoffersen perceived 
the crucial distinguishing feature of Moe, there is 
yet another reason why it is inapposite here. The 
School District resisted plaintiff's suit to recover 
the remaining purchase price on the ground the con-
tracts were ultra vires in that at the time the con-
tracts were entered the District had exceeded the debt 
limitation of the Constitution, and had not first ob-
tained a vote of the taxpayers required to exceed the 
limitation formula. Plaintiff conceded that he could 
not recover upon the contracts nor upon quantum meruit, 
but argued that he should be allowed to remove~ the 
plumbing and heating materials if he returned to the 
District the monies he had received as partial payment. 
The District claimed that the materials had become fix-
tures and could not be removed without harm to the build-
ing. In rejecting this defense, the Court noted that 
many of the items could be removed easily and without 
damaging the building. It then held that the contractors 
be permitted to remove so much of the materials in value 
as had not been paid for. It further stated: 
... there is nothing to prevent 
the defendant school district from now 
... entering into a valid contracti'or 
the purchase of the materials as presently 
installed. 54 Utah 144, 150. 
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Judge Christoffersen thus could have added as an ad-
ditional ground for not applying Moe the fact that the 
contracts there were not wholly outside the powers of 
the District to make but the District could have cured 
the temporary defect by entering new valid contracts. 
The contracts here, however, are ultra vires in the 
primary sense of being wholly outside the powers of 
the entity to make under the holding of the First Equity 
case. 
The brokers also offer language from Millard 
School District v. State Bank of Millard County, 80 Utah 
170, 185 (Utah, 1932). However, the contract in question 
there was outside the powers of a private corporation, 
not outside the powers of the school district, The lan-
guage quoted is therefore completely inapplicable. 
G. THESE TRANSACTIONS, BEING ULTRA VIRES, 
CANNOT BE RATIFIED. 
Bosworth--but not the four brokers--assert that 
the University ratified the purchase contracts, or at 
least a question of fact exists on this point. It is not 
necessary to determine if there is such a factual dispute 
since as a matter of law these ultra vires contracts can-
~~- -~~ 
not be ratified. The leading treatise states simply: 
Contracts which a municipal cor-
poration is not permitted legally to enter 
into are not subject to ratification [citing 
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scores of cases from 29 jurisdictions] 
McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3rd Ed.), 
Section 29.104(c), pp. 512-513. 
The rationale for not ap~lying traditional con-
cepts of ratification law to these contracts should 
be obvious. Dishonest public officials otherwise could 
easily circumvent the prohibition again?t ultra vires 
contracts by the simple expedient of ratifying them. 
Bosworth's cases are not helpful because they 
do not involve ultra vires contracts of public bodies. 
H. THE UNIVERSITY IS NOT ESTOPPED FROM 
SEEKING RECOVERY OF ITS LOSSES 
The brokers place great emphasis on their argu-
ment that estoppel precludes any recovery here. Their 
argument fails because as a matter of law estoppel does 
not apply against a public body, at least in these cir-
cumstances. It also fails because even if estoppel were 
available, the brokers have not and cannot make out the 
facts necessary to give rise to an estoppel. 
The brokers' reliance on estoppel is not new. 
As amicus curiae, they argued it unsuccessfully to this 
Court in First Equity. The Court stated: 
" All persons dealing with officers or 
agents of counties are bound to ascertain 
the limits of their authority or power as 
fixed by statutory or organic law, and are 
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chargeable with knowledge of such limits. 
No estoppel can be created by the acts of 
such agents or officers in excess of their 
statutory or constitutional powers." 
For further authority for the proposition that 
"one who deals with a municipal corporation does 
so at his peril" see Thatcher Chemical Co. v. 
Salt Lake City Corporation, 21 Utah 2d 355, 455 
P.2d 769 (1968) and cases cited therein. 
If the enforcement of this rule at times 
appears harsh, it is a matter for the State Legis-
lature to correct. P. 892. 
Additional Utah authority that the government cannot be 
estopped is found in Petty v. Borg, 106 Utah 524, 150 P. 
2d 776 (1944) in which the Court stated: 
... the government is not bound or 
estopped by the acts of its officers or agents 
which are not within the scope of their author-
ity so the doctrine of estoppel is of no aid 
to the defendant here. 
See also 10 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, (1966 Rev. 
Vol.) Section 29.104c, p. 517, citing 22 cases from 17 
jurisdictions. 
The two Utah cases cited by the brokers herein~/ 
were cited by them as amici curiae in First Eguity--but 
with no success. In Provo City v. Denver & Rio Grande 
Western, 156 F.2d 710 (10th Cir., 1946), the Court con-
strued those two cases very narrowly. The Court said, at 
p. 712: 
£Q.I W a1 1 v . Sal t La k e Ci t y , 5 O u ta h 5 9 3 , 16 8 P . 7 6 6 ( 191 ?l 
and Tooele v. Elkington, 100 Utah 485, 116 P.2d 406 
( 19 41) . 
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These ... cases, considered in 
their composite effect, seem to make it 
clear that in Utah the principle of estoppel 
in pais is to be applied very narrowly to a 
city in respect of its right to reopen a 
street for use as a public thoroughfare and 
only in cases where the city acted within 
the ambit of its legal authority but in an 
irregular way. 
In the appeal at bar, the University did more than act 
"within the ambit of its legal authority, but in an 
irregular way;" it acted completely outside the ambit 
of its legal authority. 
The four brokers refer to the views of several 
commentators and state that the rule precluding the ap-
plication of estoppel to the government is "now a largely 
discarded traditional view." Nowhere can support for 
this hyperbole be found. Even the brokers' leading 
critic of the estoppel rule--Professor K.C, Davis--admits 
that 
... the courts usually hold that the 
doctrine of equita~l~ estoppel does not apply 
to the government.~/ 
Professor Davis nowhere says the courts have abandoned 
or are abandoning this rule.££/ Recent cases he cites 
QI 
lll 
2 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, Section 
17.01 at 491 (1958). 
Even in K. Davis, Administrative Law of the Seventies, 
he states: "Of course close and difficult problems of 
estoppel of states or cities still arise which can 
properly go either way." Paragraph 17.05, p. 409. 
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following the traditional view and not applying 
estoppel to states or cities include Austin Liquor 
Mart, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 280 N.E.2d 437 
(Ill. lg72) and Sykes v. Bell, 179 S.E.2d 439 (N.Car. 
1971). In Austin Liquor Mart,~. the Court stated 
significantly: 
It is firmly established that 
where the public revenues are involved, 
public policy ordinarily forbids the 
application of estoppel to the State. 
The above language points up the defect in the brokers' 
argument that the winds of change are blowing away the 
rule in question in all situations. The cases they 
cite, such as Moser v. United States, 341 U.S. 41 (1951), 
do not involve the payment of public monies under ultra 
vires contracts and hence do not consider the public 
policy considerations present here. In Moser, the ap-
plication of the estoppel doctrine was necessary to 
allow a person to apply for American citizenship on the 
same footing as others. The protection of this personal 
right involves the weighing of considerations far differ-
ent from those requiring a corporation to ascertain the 
limits of authority of a public agency from whom profit 
is sought. Other cases the brokers cite are City of 
Marseilles v. Hus tis, 325 N.E.2d 767 (Ill. 1975) and 
Franks v. City of Aurora, 362 P.2d 561 (Colo. 1961). 
-45-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
These likewise do not involve ultra vires payments 
and attendant public policy considerations relating 
to fiscal integrity. 
The four brokers devote several pages to an 
1878 decision of the United States Supreme Court, 
Hackett v. City of Otowa, 99 U.S. 86 (1878). There, 
a city issued bonds which recited on their face that 
the proceeds therefrom were to be used for municipal 
purposes. The city had unquestioned authority to issue 
bonds for municipal purposes but the proceeds from the 
bonds in question were used to assist a private corpo-
ration. The Court held the bond holder did not know 
how these proceeds were to be used and had no way of 
knowing they would be used for a non-municipal purpose. 
The cases at bar are easily distinguishable in that the 
brokers could have known, and therefore should be charged 
with knowledge, that the investments here were ultra vires. 
In Hackett, it was not the issuance of bonds which was 
ultra vires but how the bond proceeds were spent. Here, 
the purchase itself was ultra vires. 
But even if this Court overrules itself in First 
Equity and earlier cases and holds that estoppel will lie 
against the State in some circumstances, the brokers have 
still not made out the facts raising the defense under 
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the most favorable case law they cite. Under the cases 
cited by the brokers, for estoppel to serve as a bar 
against the government, the government must have been 
aware of the facts given rise to the estoppel at the 
time of their operation (Four brokers' brief, p. 32). 
The brokers have not shown, nor can they, that when the 
University purported to authorize Catron to purchase 
stock, it knew it had no statutory power. The brokers' 
argument is ironic. It recognizes that for estoppel to 
lie, the party to be estopped must know the facts and 
the party asserting estoppel must be ignorant of the 
true facts. Id. And whereas the cases, including those 
of this Court, have universally held that a party dealing 
with the government is charged with knowledge of the ex-
tent of its power to contract, the brokers urge this 
Court to hold that such a party is ignorant of the true 
facts for purposes of applying estoppel; at the same time 
the brokers would have this Court charge the University 
with knowledge that it lacked power to invest in common 
stock for purposes of the estoppel rule. Such a rule as 
the brokers thus espouse should control the facts here 
finds support from no source, even from Professor Davis. 
Nowhere is the weakness of the brokers' estoppel argument 
better refuted than in Judge Christoffersen's second 
memorandum decision on liability: 
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This Court feels that the brokers 
cannot escape liability for their illegal 
acts, acts with which they are charged 
legally with knowing to be illegal by say-
ing officials of Utah State also knew this 
and were charged with this knowledge. The 
Court feels where a governmental entity is 
involved and the parties are charged with 
the legal use of public funds that the other 
illegal party cannot escape liability by 
saying the specific party we dealt with 
does not come into this matter with clean 
hands either. (Bear Stearns, R. 2186) 
1. Rules of the National Association of 
Security Dealers and Stock Exchanges 
of which these brokers are members require 
that knowledge of the University's lack of 
power be charged to the brokers. 
These brokers were at all relevant times members 
of the National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD"), 
the New York Stock Exchang.e ("NYSE") and the American Stock 
Exchange ("AMEX").fl/ As such, they were all subject to 
rules of those organizations which imposed on them a duty 
to ascertain if a customer had legal power to purchase stock 
or borrow money. These rules read as follows: 
Section 2, Article III, of the NASD 
Rules of Fair Practice ("suitability rule"). 
In recommending to a customer the 
purchase, sale or exchange of any se-
curity, a member shall have reasonable 
grounds for believing that the recom-
mendation is suitable for such customer 
upon the basis of the facts, if any, 
disclosed by such customer as to his 
See e.g. Bear Stearns, R. 210, at 221-222 and 225-226, 
228; and Security Dealers of North America, lOOth through 
102nd Revised Volumes. 
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ru 1 e") . 
ru 1 e"). 
other security holdings and as to 
his financial situation and needs. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Rule 405 of the NYSE ("due diligence 
Every member organization is required 
through a general partner, a principal 
executive officer or a person or persons 
designated under the provisions of Rule 
342(b)(l) ... to ... use due diligence 
to learn the essential facts relative to 
every customer, every order, every cash 
or margin account accepted or carried by 
such organization .... (Emphasis added.) 
Rule 411 of the AMEX ("due diligence 
Every member, member firm or member 
corporation shall use due diligence to 
learn the essential facts relative to 
every customer and to every order or ac-
count accepted .... The member, general 
partner or officer approving the opening 
of an account shall, prior to giving his 
approval, be personally informed as to 
the essential facts relative to the cus-
tomer and to the nature of the proposed 
account .... (Emphasis added.) 
These rules exist pursuant to federal securities law. The 
suitability rule was promulgated under Section 15A of the 
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. Section 78o-3). 
The due diligence rules of the major exchanges were filed 
pursuant to Section 6 of the same act (15 U.S.C. Section ?Sf). 
All of the brokers except Sutro violated the NASO 
suitability rule by recommending stock the University was 
precluded by law from purchasing. Further, none of these 
brokers fulfilled their duty of due diligence to learn whether 
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the University had power to purchase stock or borrow on 
margin. Certainly, their lone act of obtaining a routine 
corporate resolution did not discharge this duty. See 
footnote 7 at page 9, ~· 
As held by the Trial Court, the law has always 
charged a person dealing with a public body with construc-
tive knowledge of the body's contractual powers. This it 
has done even in the absence of rules imposing affirmative 
obligations on a person dealing with the government to as-
certain its powers. Where, as here, such rules exist pur-
suant to law, there is even greater reason to charge the 
brokers with knowledge of the University's limitations as 
to these stock purchase and margin loans. Although this 
Court might be inclined to relax the traditional view of 
estoppel as applied to public bodies in the right situation, 
the brokers' failure in these cases to comply with their duty 
(1) to have reasonable grounds as to the suitability for the 
University of the many stocks they recommended, or (2) their 
duty to use due diligence to learn the most essential fact 
relative to the University's purchase orders and loan re-
quests--whether they were lawful--militates against departing 
from settled law here. 
I. IT IS NO DEFENSE THAT THE BROKERS HAVE CHANGED 
THEIR POSITION IN RELIANCE ON THE REGULARITY 
OF THESE TRANSACTIONS. 
The four brokers argue that all they retained in 
-50-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
these transactions were their broker commissions. They 
then assert that all these commissions were "paid out 
through the ordinary course of business to satisfy [their] 
regular expenses ... " (four brokers' brief, p. 50). They 
apparently would have the Court believe that none of the 
commissions thus retained contributed to their profits--which 
is on its face totally unbelievable. But even if all four 
brokers lost money during the three years in question--a 
conjecture not supported in the record--their argument does 
not cover the underwriting discounts they retained in those 
instances where they sold the University stock out of their 
own inventories. Nor does it explain why Merrill Lynch 
should not return to the University over $193,000.00 it re-
ceived as interest. Since this Court must affirm on the 
liability issue even if the University is entitled to re-
cover only some of its claimed losses, and the four brokers' 
argument does not go to all of the University's damages 
claims, their argument is no good defense here. 
But even more defeating than the above factual 
difficulty is the erroneous legal basis of their argument. 
The four brokers rely on a case not involving ultra ~ 
payments by a public entity for their position that restitu-
tion is not proper where the money wrongfully received has 
since been spent.fi/ This case they link with Section 69 
~/ Saw er v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Car . , 236 F.2d 518 
10th Cir. 1956 . See footnote 164 of the four brokers' 
brief. 
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of the Restatement of Restitution. But as discussed, ~. 
at p. 38, the section of the Restatement of Restitution which 
a p p l i e s h e re i s 4 6 ( a ) . .QI 
Bosworth also urges the defense of change of posi-
tion in reliance on the regularity of these transactions but 
cites only one case in its support. In Maricopa County v. 
Cities and Towns, 467 P.2d 949 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1970), the 
county sued its own cities and towns to recover tax funds it 
erroneously transferred for over 16 years. Because the defen-
dants were also public bodies, had not sought the payments, 
and had spent the funds on public roads, the court departed 
from what it expressly acknowledged as the general rule of 
Section 46(a) of the Restatement of Restitution and denied 
recovery. The announced .rationale, however, was not solely 
a change of circumstances as Bosworth claims. The court under-
scored the narrow scope of its holding by invoking laches 
and estoppel as well. It stated: 
We agree to the extent that neither 
laches nor its generic parent, estoppel, can 
be asserted to gain rights against the public 
or to defeat the public interest [citing cases]. 
But the reason for the rule denying the defense 
disappears when the contest is solely between 
two public bodies. 467 P.2d 949 at 953. 
First Equity has held that estoppel is not a defense where, 
as here, one of the contestants is a private party. The same 
would be true of its generic offspring, laches and change of 
circumstances. 
Stating that a State agency conferring benefits under 
a mistake of law is entitled to restitution. 
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J. THE UNIVERSITY'S CLAIMS ARE NOT BARRED 
BY THE EQUITABLE DOCTRINE OF UNCLEAN HANDS. 
Only Bosworth raises the defense of unclean hands. 
Its argument is that since the University is seeking the 
equitable remedy of rescission, the University's action in 
wrongfully inducing Bosworth to accept the purchase orders 
constituted "unclean hands." Further, Bosworth claims that 
the University's failure to notify it after December 15, 1972, 
that the Attorney General questioned the legality of the in-
vestment program was a separate instance of unclean hands. 
Bosworth's argument suffers from at least three 
defects. First, the University does not seek equitable re-
lief; therefore, the equitable defense of unclean hands does 
not apply. These suits do not seek rescission of voidable 
contracts but instead seek repayment of monies paid out under 
void contracts. The rules governing the recovery of ultra 
vires public expenditures have been treated as part of the 
common law unaffected by equitable considerations. See e.g. 
the discussion in Gerzof at pp. 28-29, ~· The four brokers 
recognize this and call these suits "common lav1 claims" (four 
brokers' brief, p. 5). 
Assuming, arguendo, that the University here seeks 
equitable relief, it is decidedly untrue, as Bosworth boldly 
avers, that "it must be taken as true that the University af-
firmatively and wrongfully induced Bosworth to act to its detri· 
ment" (Bosworth brief, p. 30). As Judge Christoffersen early not 
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L 
... the broker-dealers are not 
innocent as opposed to those individuals 
they dealt with at the University. [T]hey too 
are charged with the knowledge that the Uni-
versity could not deal in common stocks, 
yet they entered into the transactions as-
sumingly for profits of their own and now 
seek to avoid the responsibility for them 
(Merri 11 Lynch, R. 396). 
And as he stated in his final memorandum decision on liabil-
i ty: 
This Court has repeatedly stated 
and now holds that in this case there are 
more than two parties interested in this 
matter and who have financial interest 
other than Utah State and the brokers and 
that is the taxpayers whose money was used 
in these transactions and whose money was 
lost by reason of these transactions. 
This Court feels that the brokers cannot 
escape liability for their illegal acts, 
acts with which they are charged legally 
with knowing to be illegal by saying of-
ficials of Utah State also knew this and 
were charged with this knowledge. The 
Court feels where a governmental entity 
is involved and the parties are charged 
with the l'ega 1 use of public funds that 
the other illegal party cannot escape 
liability by saying the specific party 
we dealt with does not come into this 
matter with clean hands either (Bear, R. 2185). 
Finally, Bosworth's assertion that the University 
soiled its hands as to those transactions after December 15, 
1972, by not alerting Bosworth to possible legal problems 
raised by an Attorney General's opinion of that date is no 
ground for reversal of the ruling on liability since Bosworth 
did business with the University on many occasions prior to 
December 15, 1972. At best, the argument only goes to reduce 
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recoverable losses. The assertion, moreover, suffers 
from the more fundamental weakness that the maxim "One 
who deals with a municipal corporation does so at his 
peril"~/ does not depend upon whether the municipal 
corporation is itself aware of its own contractual limita-
tions. Bosworth's duty to ascertain the limits of the 
University's power obtains irrespective of the University's 
ignorance or knowledge of them. Bosworth cannot be heard 
to complain that the result of this rule in these circum-
stances is inequitable in view of the widespread publicity 
given to the Attorney General's December 15, 1972, opinion 
in both Salt Lake City newspapers (where Bosworth's office 
was) and the fact that the managers of the collecting banks 
in Logan which Bosworth used had read the newspaper reports 
and knew of the possible illegality. 
Wall v. Salt Lake City, ~· upon which Bosworth 
relies, has been discussed and distinguished already,~· 
pp. 43-44. Marin v. Calmenson, 197 N.W. 262 (Minn. 1924), 
is inapposite because, inter alia, it did not involve a pub-
lic body or tax monies. 
K. THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING VIOLATES NEITHER 
DUE PROCESS NOR EQUAL PROTECTION GUARANTEES. 
The four brokers complain their rights guaranteed 
by the due process and equal protection clauses of the Utah 
~/ First Equity, p. 892. 
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and United States Constitutions were violated. Bosworth 
echoes these complaints as to due process, but not as to 
equal protection. 
The brokers' briefs at this point are long on 
rhetoric but short on closely analyzed legal precedent. 
Typical of the rhetoric are Bosworth's claims that it "took 
great pains" and "did everything reasonably within its power 
to determine the validity of its dealings with the Univer-
sity." Y._/ Significantly, however, not one case cited in 
support of either the due process or equal protection argu-
ments involves an ultra vires transaction by a public body. 
It is instructive that the brokers cannot find even one case 
on point in view of the hundreds of cases decided in virtually 
every jurisdiction on the issue of whether a public entity 
can recover monies paid out pursuant to ultra vires contracts. 
Surely if these well known constitutional objections were 
persuasive defenses under these circumstances, they would 
have been urged many times before. The fact that no court 
has discussed either objection in an ultra vires setting is 
convincing, if circumstantial, evidence that judges have not 
been impressed by them. 
The short answer to the due process objection was 
that given by the Trial Court here: 
ll_! Bosworth brief, pp. 30, 33. That Bosworth took no 
pains which it would not have taken for a private 
customer is discussed, ~· at page 9. 
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As to their fifth allegation al-
leging there should be a dismissal because 
of a denial of due process has been deter-
mined in Utah in Thatcher Chemical Co. v. 
Salt Lake City Corp., 455 P.2d 769, News 
Advocate Publishing Co. v. Carbon County, 
269 P. 129, and in the First Equity case. 
The one who deals with a public entity, 
such as Utah State, does so at their peril 
and that recovery is appropriate if other 
defenses are not valid. (Merrill Lynch, 
R. 394) 
The four brokers' equal protection argument is 
that there is no rational basis for treating the University 
different from private persons in the matter of legal de-
fenses available to these lawsuits. As might be expected, 
no real authority is mentioned for this sweeping proposition. 
Moreoever, in light of the public policy considerations pain-
stakingly articulated in First Equity, Miller v. McKinnon, 
~· and Gerzof v. Sweeney, ~. to name only a few of 
the many cases cited in D, ~. the proposition is demon-
strably false. There are ample legitimate public policy 
grounds for precluding the defense of estoppel where to 
allow it would open wide the doors to the public treasury. 
Greenhalgh v. Payson City, 530 P.2d 799 (Utah, 1975) is not 
authority that this Court feels the University's "right to 
resist estoppel is properly no broader than its right to in-
voke sovereign immunity." (Four brokers' brief, p. 46.) That 
case s imply construed the term "government a l fun ct i on" to ex -
elude a city hospital. The holding of that case assumes no 
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constitutional dimensions as the brokers suggest. Indeed, 
the holding has been legislatively reversed by a 1978 
amendment to the Governmental Immunity Act, Section 63-30-3, 
Utah Code Annotated (1953). 
L. THE ARGUMENT BASED ON THE UTAH UNIFORM 
FIDUCIARY ACT IS NO BAR TO THESE SUITS. 
The brokers contend that the University had 
authority to invest non-appropriated funds in common stock, 
and that Catron was a fiduciary of the University. From 
these assumptions, they conclude no liability lies against 
the broker-dealers by reason of the Utah Uniform Fiduciary 
Act. This argument has three defects. First, the first 
assumption has already been rejected by this Court in First 
Equity in holding that a'll monies in the University's posses-
sion, even monies acquired by gift, were subject to the same 
investment restrictions. That the Court dealt with the is-
sue is seen from its conclusion that the University "had no 
specific designated power from the Constitution or the legis-
lature to invest its funds in securities outside those de-
clared lawful by 33-1-1 .. ~ 7 al," which section governs all 
funds "in [USU's] possession." Secondly, this Court in that 
case fully considered the Utah Uniform Fiduciary Act argu-
ment urged here, it having been raised and thoroughly briefed 
in the Petition for Rehearing. See the University's nineteen-
2 7 a I Fi rs t E qui ty , p . 8 9 2 . 
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page Brief opposing the Petition, Utah Supreme Court Ab-
stracts and Briefs, Volume 904. The petition was denied. 
The key case cited by the four brokers is 
Sendak v. Trustees of Indiana University, 260 N.E.2d 601 (Ind 
1970). In Sendak, the court was faced with the simple 
question of whether Indiana University could use donated 
monies to buy stock in a private corporation without violat-
ing the Indiana Constitution prohibiting the State of Indiana 
from becoming a stockholder in a private corporation. The 
court concluded that it could do so, on the ground that 
Indiana University had been held to be a "private corpora-
tion" by prior decisions and not part of the State; the 
monies, therefore, never became property of the State and 
thus could be managed free from state restrictions. 260 N.E. 
2d 601, 604. In contrast, the Utah Supreme Court on two oc-
casions has soundly rejected the argument that the University 
(and the University of Utah) are corporations separate and 
apart from the State of Utah. University of Utah v. Board 
of Examiners,~; and Spence v. USAC, 119 U. 104, 113-114, 
225 P.2d 18. Moreover, the Utah Legislature has never be-
1 ieved that monies donated to the University do not become 
subject to the control of the state; this clearly appears 
from the passage of an Act in 1925, found in Chapter 16 of 
the Session Laws for that year. Section 6 of that Act states, 
in relevant part: 
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All monies received by the Uni-
versity of Utah or the Agricultural Col-
lege of Utah from any source whatsoever, 
shall be paid into the state treasury at 
the close of the months of June and December 
of each year and shall be placed to the cred-
it of the maintenance account of the respec-
tive institution. (Emphasis added.) 
The above statute was itself merely a rephrasing of statu-
tory language appearing as early as 1917. At no time in the 
some thirty years or more that language was law was it even 
challenged, let alone held to be invalid. 
A third fatal defect to the Fiduciary Act argument 
is the inapplicability of that Act to these facts, which clear-
ly appears from language in Sugarhouse Finance v. Zions First 
National Bank, 21 Utah 2d 68, 440 P.2d 896 (1968): 
The purposes to be accomplished by 
this [Uniform Fiduciary] Act would seem to 
be to facilitate banking and financial trans-
actions by relieving the depositary banks and 
others dealing with a fiduciary from the duty 
imposed at common law of seeing that fiduciary 
funds are properly applied to the account of 
the principal. In other words, the statute 
places a duty upon principals to use only 
honest fiduciaries, and gives relief to those 
who deal with fiduciaries except where they 
know the fiduciary is breaching his duty to 
his principal or where they have knowledge 
of such facts that their actions in dealing 
with the fiduciary amount to bad faith. 
(Emphasis added.) Pp. 69-70. 
The operative language of Section 22-1-5 relied upon here 
states that the "payee" of a check "is not bound to inquire 
whether a fiduciary is committing a breach of his obligations 
as fiduciary in drawing" the check unless he takes the check 
with actual or constructive notice of the breach. In 
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the cases at bar, there is no issue as to whether Catron 
breached his obligation to the University under Section 
22-1-5 because the Administration and Institutional Council 
believed~ monies in the pool could lawfully be used to 
purchase stock. This is not a case where Catron had author-
ity to invest only non-appropriated funds but breached his 
duty by investing appropriated funds as well. 
The four brokers refer to informal oral and 
written opinions of the Attorney General to the effect that 
endowment funds could lawfully be invested in stock even if 
appropriated funds could not. The two informal letter opin-
ions cited no authority at all for their conclusion and were 
written before First Equity held that no money in the Uni-
versity's possession could be invested in stock, The first 
letter was the December 15, 1972, informal opinion which 
first cast doubt on the investment program's legality and 
the second was written long after the program terminated. 
The brokers do not claim any of them relied on the Attorney 
General's erroneous advice so they can claim no prejudice 
resulted from these opinions. Indeed, the brokers strenu-
ously urge that they should not be charged with knowledge 
of the newspaper accounts of the Attorney General's December 
15, 1972,opinion letter merely because the managers of the 
two collecting banks read those accounts. 
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M. THE UNIVERSITY CLEARLY SUFFERED 
SUBSTANTIAL MONETARY LOSSES. 
Bosworth--but not the four brokers--argues 
there is a question of fact as to whether the University 
suffered any loss because the Legislature appropriated 
to it slightly over one million dollars to cover some of 
its losses. This argument has been urged many times 
before in this and the earlier federal litigation but 
never accepted. (To be sure, Bosworth devotes only three 
sentences to its repetition here.) Common sense, however, 
wars with the notion that the University, as arm of the 
State, suffered no loss because the Legislature passed a 
special appropriation to assist the University in its most 
dire extremities. The simple refutation is that there is 
no evidence the Legislature intended to extinguish any 
right of recovery against the brokers or otherwise aid 
them. Indeed, it would have been unconstitutional for 
the Legislature to have so aided the brokers. Utah Con-
stitution, Article IV, Section 29. It is elementary that 
a statute should be construed so as to avoid unconstitution-
ality. In this case, it is easy to construe the Supplemental 
Appropriations Act of 1974 to avoid an unconstitutional re-
sult. The Act only says as to the amount going to the Uni-
versity that it is to "replace losses incurred in the Uni-
versity's investment program .... " How Bosworth can 
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construe that language to be intended to absolve it or 
any other person legally liable for those losses escapes 
comprehension. 
The argument has a second flaw. The Legislature 
appropriated only a million dollars. The complaints to-
gether pray for over four million. The complaint against 
Bosworth alone seeks over one million. Although the Uni-
versity has not established its losses on the Record, the 
reason it has not is because the Court has not yet reached 
the issue of damages. To say, as Bosworth does, that the 
University must prove its damages to be over the amount of 
the special appropriation is to ignore the procedural pos-
ture of this case. 
N. THE DECISION OF THE TENTH CIRCUIT IN 
RELATED LITIGATION IS NO BAR TO RECOVERY 
IN THESE SUITS. 
The brokers suggest that this Court should be 
bound by a decision of the Tenth Circuit in related litiga-
tion. Utah State v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 549 F.2d 164 (10th 
Cir. 1977). Contrary to the brokers' view, however, there 
is little if any similarity between the University's federal 
law claims rejected there and its state law claims allowed 
by the Trial Court here. In Federal Court, the University 
sued on the basis that the brokers violated the "suitability 
rule" of the NASO and the "due diligence" rule of the New 
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York and American Stock Exchanges discussed, ~· at 
pp. 48-50. The University's theory was that these viola-
tions were of rules of quasi-public associations and as 
such constituted wrongs against the University giving rise 
to private actions in the courts. The Tenth Circuit held, 
however, that absent broker conduct "tantamount to fraud," 
no private right of action arose under either of these rules. 
The rule that a public body can recover monies paid out pur-
suant to ultra vires contracts was not before the Tenth Cir-
cuit. Indeed, the actions before this Court are based on 
state law ultra vires principles over which there is no fed-
eral jurisdiction. The Tenth Circuit's language means only 
that the ultra vires character of these purchase orders does 
not imply that the brokers' acceptance of them was "tantamount 
to fraud" so as to give the University a federal right of 
action. The Tenth Circuit did not say that the brokers did 
not violate the rules for purposes of disciplinary action by 
the New York or American Stock Exchanges or by the NASD. 
Not only is the language quoted from the Tenth 
Circuit opinion irrelevant to these suits but one sentence 
of it is totally untrue. The University here does not seek 
to "retain the profits it has made and recover from the 
brokers the losses which it has sustained." In all these 
cases, it prays only for the difference between its losses 
on securities purchased through the defendant broker and 
-64- j 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
what it gained on profitable security investments made 
through the broker.~/ 
Finally, it is not true as the brokers intimate 
that the suits before this Court now are the same as those 
brought in federal court. The University's suits against 
these brokers were initially filed in the United States 
District Court for the District of Utah because only in 
federal court could it urge its securities law (NASD and 
Stock Exchange Rules) theories. To those federal law theo-
ries, it is true, the University added under the doctrine 
of pendent jurisdiction the theory of recovery under common 
law urged here. When Judge Aldon Anderson dismissed the 
federal law theories, there were no longer any claims for 
relief over which he had jurisdiction to which the common 
law theory of recovery urged here could be appended. Con-
sequently, Judge Anderson dismissed the common law theory 
of recovery without prejudice to it being refiled in state 
court. At no time did any federal court rule on the theory 
of recovery now before this Court. 
0. EVEN IF THIS COURT HOLDS THAT THE BROKERS 
ARE NOT LIABLE FOR LOSSES FROM STOCKS PUR-
CHASED AFTER THE BROKERS OBTAINED CORPORATE 
RESOLUTION FROM THE UNIVERSITY, THE JUDGMENTS 
SHOULD STILL BE AFFIRMED AS TO AT LEAST THREE 
OF THE BROKERS. 
The four brokers state that they did not open 
~/ In the Merrill Lynch case, the University seeks other 
heads of damage occasioned by margin account dealings. 
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accounts for the University until after they received 
written resolutions from University officials (four 
brokers' brief, p. 59). This is demonstrably false. 
Merrill Lynch's own affiant admits it opened an account 
with the University on July 22, 1970, although no corpo-
rate resolution was received until November 30, 1970 
(Merrill Lynch, R. 1433, 1437). Before receiving the 
resolution, Merrill Lynch conducted nineteen (19) trans-
actions for the University (R. 1, 10-11). 
As has already been noted, neither Hornblower 
nor Bear Stearns has established that they ever obtained 
a University resolution. See, ~· page 9, footnote 6. 
Bear Stearns' affiant does attach to his affidavit the 
first page of the January 20, 1972, corporate resolution 
but not the second page which would have borne the signature 
and seal of the Secretary of the University's Institutional 
• 
Council .'l:.1.1 But even if this Court admits new evidence suf-
ficient to satisfy it that Bear Stearns did receive an authen-
tic copy of the January 20, 1972, resolution on or soon after 
that date, it should still affirm the judgment as to liability 
against Bear Stearns as to six purchase orders it accepted 
from the University between August 20, 1971, and the date of 
the resolution. (Bear Stearns, R. 720-722, 1998-1999). Bear 
Stearns concedes it did not obtain a resolution copy for five 
~/ See pp. 91-92 of the four brokers' brief for both pages 
of that resolution. 
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months and that in opening a new account for the University 
it ignored its own requirement to obtain a corporate resolu-
tion (R. 263, 1998-1999, 2004). 
As has also been noted, Hornblower's affiant at-
tached nothing to his affidavit. As far as the record shows, 
then, Hornblower never received a true copy of any corporate 
resolution. Assuming, however, this Court allows Hornblower 
to supplement its evidence at this late date, and that evi-
dence shows Hornblower relied on a copy of the January 20, 
1972, resolution, it should still affirm the judgment against 
Hornblower as to fourteen trades it executed for the Univer-
sity from December 8, 1971, to the date of the resolution. 
(Hornblower, R. 447-449) 
I I 
EVEN IF THE UNIVERSITY'S MOTIONS FOR PAR-
TIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ARE REVERSED, THE 
TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF THE BROKERS' 
MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE 
A CLAIM FOR RELIEF SHOULD BE AFFIRMED. 
The brokers blithely assume that their Rule 12(b)(6) 
motions to dismiss must be granted if the University's motions 
for summary judgment as to liability should fail. This assump-
tion is fallacious in at least two respects. 
A. THERE ARE TRIABLE ISSUES OF FACT AS TO 
THE CORPORATE RESOLUTIONS OF AUTHORITY 
Except for Merrill Lynch, the brokers have not 
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filed their own motions for summary judgment.lQ_/ They 
have, however, submitted affidavits purporting to demon-
strate that each of them obtained a cooy of a corporate 
resolution from the University before transacting business 
with it. However, as has just been discussed,~. pp. 
65-67, there is a substantial question as to whether Bear 
Stearns and Hornblower ever obtained copies of any resolu-
tion purporting to authorize the purchase of stock. More-
over, it is clear from the record that none of these brokers 
filed testimony as to when they obtained copies of resolu-
tions from the University.lll It is also undisputed that 
Hornblower and Bear Stearns accepted and filled many Univer-
sity purchase orders months before January 20, 1972, the 
date of the resolution upon which all the other as well as 
Bear Stearns definitely r~ly. Likewise, Merrill Lynch alone 
accepted and executed nineteen purchase orders before first 
receiving a copy of a University resolution of authority 
(Merrill Lynch, R. 1, 10-11). Finally, a question is raised 
as to whether Bosworth obtained a copy of the January 20, 
1972, resolution upon which it relies before February 1, 
lQ_/ Merrill Lynch's motion for summary judgment was denied, 
the Trial Court finding triable issues of material facts. 
Not even Merrill Lynch's affiant gave a date although a 
resolution attached to his affidavit appears to bear a 
date stamp of November 30, 1970 (R. 1433, 1437). 
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1972--the date of its first purchase for the University. 
All that is known is that Bosworth's affiant did not 
specify when the resolution copy was received. 
If this Court holds that the brokers should not 
answer for any University losses after receiving written 
authority, the University's complaints cannot be dismissed 
as to those transactions conducted before then. At the 
very least, Bear Stearns, Hornblower and Merrill Lynch are 
liable for losses on all securities they brokered for the 
University prior to January 20, 1972, when the University 
passed the resolution upon which they appear to rely. There-
fore, the brokers' Rule 12(b)(6) motions were properly denied 
below. 
B. THERE IS A TRIABLE ISSUE OF FACT WHETHER 
PUBLICITY SURROUNDING THE DECEMBER 15, 1972 
ATTORNEY GENERAL LETTER OPINION WAS KNOWN 
TO,OR SHOULD BE CHARGED TO, THE BROKERS. 
As discussed, ~. pp. 11-12, the Logan and 
both major Salt Lake City newspapers published accounts on 
December 15 and 16, 1972, of the Attorney General's opinion 
that the investment program was illegal. Both managers of 
the two "collecting banks" read these articles. Whatever 
these managers may have then told the brokers about what 
they read (the record is silent on this point), three brokers--
Bear Stearns, Bosworth and Sutro--continued thereafter io 
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fi 11 University purchase orders. This despite there being 
ample evidence that Catron was ordered to stop buying stock 
(Broadbent 203; footnote 46 of the four brokers' brief). 
It is because of the purchases made after December 15, 1972, 
that the University suffered most of its multi-million dollar 
1 OS S. H_/ 
For the brokers to prevail on their Rule 12(b)(6) 
motions, they must show that under no set of facts could the 
University prove a cause of action as to those securities 
purchased after December 15, 1972. This they cannot do. 
There is a triable issue of fact as to whether Catron re-
ceived orders to buy no more stock sometime in December, 
1972.11/ Even the brokers concede this (Bosworth brief, p. 
8). There is also at least a triable issue of fact as to 
whether the brokers should be charged with knowledge that on 
December 15, 1972, the Attorney General opined that the Uni-
versity could not legally purchase stock. Both Salt Lake City 
RI Although the record is not complete on this point, it not being central to the issue of liability, it is fully docu-
mented that between December 15, 1972, and mid-March, 1973, 
when Catron was terminated and all new purchases ceased, 
the market fell dramatically. 
On December 4, 1972, Catron was told by certain key mem-
bers of the Board of Regents (then the Board of Higher Ed-
ucation) and later that day by the Institutional Council 
to "immediately reverse the Investment Policy." (Exh. 85D, 
January 10, 1973, Minutes of Council, page 3). 
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newspapers reported on the opinion. Since Bosworth's 
office was in Salt Lake City and the office manager and 
salesman handling the University's account--Mark Haroldsen--
presumably read one or both newspapers on a periodic basis, 
it is a triable issue of fact as to whether Mark Haroldsen 
or someone else at Bosworth read or heard about the news-
paper accounts or of the Attorney General opinion itself. 
It is also at least a triable issue of fact whether the col-
lecting banks should be treated as Bosworth's agent for the 
purpose of imputing to it the knowledge the managers of 
those banks acquired by reading the newspaper accounts, 
Indeed, the Trial CoY~t impliedly so held by its expressly 
hold'ing that the collecting banks were the brokers' agents).i/ 
Although the brokers submitted several dozen affidavits 
covering many points, it is noteworthy that no affiant for 
any of the brokers denies ever hearing of the publicity sur-
rounding the Attorney General's opinion. This is all the 
more interesting in light of sworn testimony submitted by 
a collecting bank that it was unaware that the University 
ever discussed the Attorney General's December 15, 1972, 
opinion with any broker (Bear Stearns, R. 1547, 1548). 
l.1_/ Judge Christoffersen expressly held the collecting 
banks to be the brokers' agents: "A bank in Cache 
County was designated as an agent to receive delivered 
orders from [the brokers] and to pay for such orders 
in Cache County out of the accounts of USU" (Bosworth, 
R. 150). A collecting bank's affiant likewise character-
ized his relationship with the brokers as one of agency. 
Bear Stearns, R. 1548. 
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The issue, of course, is not whether the University dis-
cussed the opinion with the brokers but whether the brokers 
learned of the opinion, either through the collecting banks 
or otherwise. 
The University's principal theory of recovery 
is that the brokers were charged with constructive knowledge 
that all the stock purchases here were ultra vires. A sec-
ondary theory of recovery, pleaded here and in the earlier 
federal litigation, is that the brokers were put on actual 
notice on or shortly after December 15, 1972, that the Uni-
versity might not have power to purchase stock and that 
Catron may no longer have authority from the University to 
continue to place purchase orders. If this Court denies re-
covery as to all purchases on the primary theory, the Univer-
sity should be allowed to argue under its secondary theory 
the facts by which it claims the brokers acquired actual 
knowledge. Although the University did not conduct any dis-
covery in these cases,1.i/ the Record already contains enough 
evidence to raise triable issues of fact whether the brokers 
knew that possibly the University had no power to purchase 
any stock and/or that the University had revoked Catron's 
authority. 
}i/ Aft e r S e pt ember , 1 9 77 , the Tri a l Co u rt 1 i mi t e d the 
taking of depositions to a period of less than a 
month and seemed to extend this right only to the 
brokers (Bear Stearns, R. 1634-1636). 
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CONCLUSION TO PARTS I AND II 
Although the brokers have adduced a lengthy 
list of purported defenses, the issues of this litigation 
are few and relatively simple. Those issues were squarely 
before this Court in First Equity. These brokers were also 
before this Court in that case and argued at length--and 
unsuccessfully--most of the defenses raised here, Through-
out the protracted proceedings below, lasting four years, 
Judge Christoffersen let himself be guided by the implacable 
logic of the First Equity opinion. However harsh the re-
sult, it was for the Legislature to change.1§./ 
The brokers' appeal is not to the settled law 
of this and virtually every other state. Their appeal is 
to their self-interested view of equity. They say, in effect, 
that the State should be treated under these facts like any 
private individua1.l.Z./ This view is simplistic. The law 
does not treat all private individuals the same. Minors are 
treated differently from adults in many contexts; women some-
times treated differently from men. In each case of dissimilar 
1§.I 
l.Z.I 
First Equity, p. 892. Some states have enacted legis-
lation to modify the common law in this regard. See 
Wisconsin, Section 66.295 Stats. (1941). Utah has not 
passed such a statute. 
i 
Their quotation from Driggs v. Utah State Teachers Reti_.::i· 
ment Board, 105 Utah 417, 425-426, 142 P.2d 657, 660-661 
(1943) is misleading. The ruling there was not that the 
state should make ultra vires pension payments but that 
the teachers' rights to these payments had vested; and 
under elementary principles of constitutional law those 
rights could not be impaired by subsequent legislation. j Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
treatment, the law has concluded that policy considera-
tions justify different treatment. This rudimentary prin-
ciple of jurisprudence the brokers totally ignore. They 
have failed to show how circumstances have so changed in 
Utah that it is no longer necessary to safeguard the public 
treasury and protect the citizenry from unlimited expendi-
tures by their unbridled public servants wishing to enter 
the stock market. It is not a matter of a"conservative" 
versus a "socialistic" view of government. It is a matter of 
whether the people control their elected or appointed of-
ficials or whether those officials are allowed to commit 
public money to investments not sanctioned by the Legislature. 
The brokers' appeal to equity is thus inappropriate 
at this stage of these lawsuits. If this Court reverses, the 
University receives nothing and the public is out over four 
million dollars. Any resort to equity should be deferred to 
the damages phase of this litigation. Gerzof v. Sweeney, 
~· If it is inequitable for the University to recover 
all its losses, despite the First Equity holding,1.§./ this 
Court would then be able to fashion a measure of damages to 
take into consideration any equities which it finds to be 
present. This was precisely what was done in Gerzof. In 
1.§./ There the broker ~ought commissions and the decline in 
the value of stock between the time it purchased it for 
the University and the time the University refused pay-
ment. This Court denied recovery as to both elements of 
claimed damage. 
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stating this, the University does not concede there are 
any equities in the brokers' favor. 
The four brokers also appeal from the Trial 
Court's order denying their counterclaims against the Uni-
versity (Bosworth did not file any counterclaims). They 
expressly ask this Court to reinstate the counterclaims to 
allow them to recover their costs and attorneys' fees even 
if they prevail on the issue of liability in the principal 
actions. They devote, however, no part of their brief to 
their counterclaims (as opposed to their third-party com-
plaints). Their counterclaims are nothing more than a repe-
titian of their basic position that the University should 
bear these losses. They add nothing (except for their prayer 
for costs and attorneys' fees) and should be treated like 
their Rule 12(b)(6) motions. 
As to their prayer for costs and attorneys' fees, 
the brokers cite no relevant case authority. Even if these 
brokers prevail here, these suits can hardly be deemed fri-
volous in light of First Equity and supporting case law. 
The Trial Court should be affirmed as to all 
orders affixing the brokers with liability. 
I I I 
THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE ORDERS HOLDING 
THAT JURISDICTION IS HAD OVER THREE BROKERS 
AND VENUE IN CACHE COUNTY WAS PROPER AS TO 
TWO OTHERS. 
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A. JURISDICTION IS HAD OVER HORNBLOWER; 
BEAR STEARNS; AND SUTRO UNDER BOTH 
THE "MINIMAL CONTACTS" AND THE "DOING 
BUSINESS" TESTS. 
In Abbott G.M. Diesel v. Piper Aircraft, 578 P.2d 
850 (1978), this Court recognized two distinct concepts of 
jurisdiction over non-resident defendants which it called the 
"doing business" and "minimal contacts" tests. See especially 
footnote 6. That opinion was handed down after the parties 
hereto briefed and the Trial Court ruled on the three brokers' 
motions to dismiss for lack of .i.!!_personam jurisdiction. At that 
time, this Court had fai1ed to distinguish between the two tests. 
Hill v. Zale Corp., 25 Ut.2d 357, 482 P.2d 332 (1971). Now 
that this Court has clarified the law, the University con-
tends jurisdiction is had here over the brokers under each 
test. 
1. Statement of Facts. 
Hornblower 
(1) During the period when Catron purchased stock 
from or through it, Hornblower advertised its operations as 
"Nationwide UndenHiting and Distribution Services" with 65 
offices "coast to coast" and "over 1100 registered representa-
tives" (Bear Stearns, R. 222; hereafter, references to the 
record are to the Bear Stearns record unless noted). During 
said period, Hornblower had been in business since 1888, and 
was a member of all major stock exchanges. It also was regis-
tered in 39 states, including Utah. By early 1976, when it 
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was served herein, it was registered in all states (R. 
234). 
(2) It has been duly registered as a broker-
dealer with the Utah Securities Commission since May 14, 
1965 (R. 213). 
(3) Between December, 1971, and September, 1972, 
it executed for the University either as principal or agent 
82 purchases of stock with a total net purchase price of 
$2,238,974.80 for which it received commissions of $32,622.43 
(Hornblower, R. 56-57). 
(4) Most if not all of the securities purchased 
from Hornblower were paid for by the University delivering its 
drafts to a Logan bank in exchange for the stock certificates 
(R. 156-157). 
(5) Hornblower directed by mail to the University 
at Logan a confirmation slip for each of the 82 purchases and 
a monthly account statement during each month of the aforesaia 
period. 
(6) All of the 82 purchases were made by the Uni-
versity following recommendations made by Louis Aragon, a 
Hornblower employee, to Catron. Aragon also recommended the 
University purchase securities in other companies (R. 152). 
(7) Between June, 1972, and January, 1973, adver-
tisements for Hornblower appeared in periodicals widely cir· 
culated and read in Utah. Incomplete investigation reveals 
-77-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
17 such advertisements appeared in said period in Business 
Week, Finance Magazine, Forbes, and the Wall Street Journal, 
five of them being full-page ads. On November 12, 1975, 
another ad appeared in the Wall Street Journal (R. 180-181). 
(8) Between December, 1971, and September, 1972, 
Catron and other ~niversity employees conversed by telephone 
with Aragon and other Hornblower employees over 100 times, 
either placing or receiving virtually all if not all of these 
calls in Utah. When Catron placed these calls, it was usually 
collect, which Aragon always accepted (R. 152). 
Bear Stearns ("Bear") 
(1) During the period when Catron purchased stock 
from or through it, Bear was registered in 34 states and was 
a member of all major sto~k exchanges (R. 228). By the time 
service was effected upon Bear in this action, in March, 1976, 
it had registered in four more states, including Utah (R. 228). 
(2) Bear has been duly registered as a broker-
deal er with the Utah Securities Commission since September 
26, 1974 (R. 214). 
(3) Between August, 1971,and February, 1973, it 
executed for the University, either as principal or agent, at 
least 47 orders to purchase stock with a total net purchase 
price of $4,863,574.35 for which it received commissions of 
$35,323.59 (R. 81-82). Also, from December, 1971,to March, 
1973, it executed for the University 25 sell orders for which 
it received commissions of $34,760.33 (R. 236). 
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(4) Most if not all of the securities purchased 
from Bear were paid for by the University delivering its 
drafts to a Logan bank in exchange for the stock certificates 
(R. 156-157). 
(5) Bear sent to the University by mail at Logan 
a confirmation slip for each of the purchases and a monthly 
account statement during each month of the aforesaid period. 
(6) Many if not most of the 47 purchases listed 
in the complaint were made by the University following recom-
mendations made by Jim Christensen, a Bear salesman, to Catron 
(R. 152-153). Christensen admits making some recommendations 
(R. 239). Once, Catron and Christensen together visited the 
home office of one of the companies in which the University 
invested and spoke with a top company executive, the meeting 
having been arranged by Christensen (R. 153-154). 
(7) Between October, 1972,and January, ·1973, ad-
vertisements for Bear appeared in the Wall Street Journal. 
Incomplete investigation shows seven such advertisements ap-
peared in that four-month period alone. Another ad appeared 
December 19, 1975 (R. 180-181). 
(8) Between August, 1971, and March, 1973, Catron 
and other University employees conversed by telephone with 
Christensen and other Bear employees over 50 times, either 
placing or receiving virtually all if not all of these calls 
in Utah. When Catron placed the call, it was usually collect. 
which Christensen always accepted. 
I 
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(9) Between November, 1971, and February, 1973, 
Catron sent by mail from Logan at least 20 items of cor-
respondence to Bear (R. 157). 
Sutro 
(1) During the period when Catron placed orders 
with it to purchase securities, Sutro was registered in 12 
states, including six states east of the Mississippi River, 
although its only offices were in California (R. 226). 
By the time service was effected upon it in this action, 
in March, 1976, it had registered in 17 more states, for a 
total of 29 states. Among the states with which it registered 
within the last three years are Arizona, Nevada, Colorado and 
Wyoming (R. 232). 
(2) Between August, 1972,and January, 1973, it 
executed for the University either as principal or agent at 
least 12 orders to purchase stock having a total net purchase 
price of $1,497,860.00 for which it received commissions of 
$13,508.30 (R. 104). 
(3) Most if not all of the securities purchased 
from Sutro were paid for by the University delivering its 
drafts to a Logan bank in exchange for the stock certificates 
(R. 156-157). 
(4) Catron established an account for the Uni-
versity with Sutro after having been invited by Sutro to at-
tend a two or three day seminar for institutional investment 
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managers in Los Angeles, at which top level representatives 
of many companies discussed the investment potential in their 
respective companies. Sutro not only brought together the 
company spokesmen and otherwise sponsored the seminar, but 
also paid for meals, refreshments and entertainment for all 
attendees. Catron attended two such Sutro seminars at Sutro's 
invitation (R. 154). 
(5) Sutro sent to the University by mail at Logan 
a confirmation slip for each of the purchases and a monthly 
account statement during each month of the aforesaid period. 
(6) Between March, 1972,and February, 1973, and 
between October, 1975, and February, 1976, advertisements for 
Sutro appeared in periodicals widely circulated and read in 
Utah. Incomplete investigation shows ten such advertisements 
appeared in the Wall Street Journal, Business Week and Finance 
Magazine during the first period and eight such ads appeared 
in the Wall Street Journal alone in the second period (R. 180-
181) . 
(7) In said period, Catron and other University 
employees conversed by telephone with Diane Dyckman, Felix 
Juda, and other Sutro employees numerous times, either placing 
or receiving virtually all if not all of said calls in Utah. 
When Catron placed the call, it was usually collect, which 
Sutro always accepted (R. 154). 
(8) In February, 1973, Catron sent to Sutro from 
Logan at least two items of correspondence relating to the 
I 
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purchase and sale of 320 debentures issued by Hanover 
Square Realty Inventors for over $320,000.00 (R. 157). 
2. Jurisdiction Exists Under the "Minimal 
Contacts" Test. 
This Court in Abbott G.M. Diesel v. Piper Air-
craft,~. discussed what it termed the "minimal contacts" 
concept of Utah's long-arm statute and reiterated that Utah's 
jurisdictional standards should "not be more restrictive than 
those allowed by federal due process limitations." .!.£.at 
353. Borrowing heavily from a recent law review article,~/ 
this Court mentioned (at p. 354) three factors should be con-
sidered in applying the minimal contacts test: 
(1) the nature and quality of defendants' 
acts; 
(2) whether the defendant engaged in pur-
poseful rather than unintentional acts 
to avail itself of the privileges and 
protections of the forum state; and 
(3) any other relevant matters bearing on 
the notions of fair play and justice. 
Applying these considerations against case law 
and the facts of this litigation, it is clear that the test 
is met. 
th ere 
l11 
a. The nature and gualit,l'. of defendants' acts 
subject them to Utah's jurisdiction. 
It is not necessary, as the brokers urge, that 
be some physical presence in the State. Conn v. 
"In Personam Jurisdiction in Utah," 77 Utah Law Review 
235 (1977). 
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Whitmore, 9 Ut.2d 250, 342 P.2d 871 (Justice Crockett); 
Reeder Contractors v. Higgins Industries, 265 F.2d 768, 
773 (9th Cir. 1959) ("It is not necessary that defendants' 
agent be physically within the forum, for this act or 
transaction may be by mail only"). Since physical presence 
is unnecessary, this litigation is squarely controlled by 
Piantes v. Hayden Stone, 30 Ut.2d 110, 514 P.2d 529 (1973), 
cert. den. 415 U.S. 995, reh. den. 416 U.S. 963. There, a 
California based stockbroker sold stock to Utah residents. 
Of over 100 solicitations he made, all but 8 were made by 
telephone from California as was done here., There, the 
stockbroker did make eight solicitations while physically 
present in Utah but that fact it has been seen could not 
alone determine the holding there that jurisdiction was 
had. 
In Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 
623, 627 (1935) an unregistered nonresident defendant was 
held to have carried on a securities business. The court 
stated that, "Iowa treats the business of dealing in cor-
porate securities as exceptional and subjects it to state 
regulation." In Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1976), 
the Supreme Court cited Doherty and Hess v. Polasky, 274 U.S. 
352 (1927), the then-leading case on nonresident motorist 
statutes, in support of statements that McGee v. Internatio~ 
Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1975) involved special legis· 
I 
I 
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lation (The California Unauthorized Insurers Process 
Act). This Act, it said, was passed by California" 
to exercise . its 'manifest interest' in providing ef-
fective redress for citizens who had been injured by non-
residents engaged in an activity that the state treats as 
exceptional and subject to special regulation," thus equat-
ing insurance, blue-sky and nonresident motorist statutes 
as special situations. 
Paulos v. Best Securities, Inc., 260 Minn. 283, 
109 N.W.2d 576 (1961) involved an action under the Minnesota 
Securities Act by a Minnesota resident against a foreign cor-
poration having no contact with Minnesota except the sale to 
the plaintiff of a security. Like Sutro, the broker was not 
registered in the forum. ~The other two brokers were reg-
istered here.) The one sale, however, was held sufficient 
to subject the corporation to the jurisdiction of the 
Minnesota courts under the Minnesota long-arm statute. 
In Koplin v. Thomas, Haab & Botts, 219 N.E.2d 
646, 651 (Ill. 1966), the sale to Illinois residents by a 
securities broker having no offices or other "presence" in 
Illinois was held to subject the broker to Illinois juris-
diction. The Koplin case is especially helpful precedent 
because it construed the Illinois long-arm statute. As ob-
served in Hughes Tool v. Meier, 486 F.2d 593, 595 (10th 
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Cir. 1973), the Utah long-arm statute is "virtually 
identical" to the language of the Uniform Interstate 
and Foreign Civil Procedure Act, the long-arm provision 
of which was patterned after the Illinois long-arm 
statute. 
b. The brokers engaged in purposeful acts 
to avail themselves of the privileges 
and protections of Utah. 
As stated by Justice Crockett in Hill v. Zale 
~. ~· jurisdiction over a foreign corporation is 
warranted by the fact alone that the corporation is: 
... permitted to enjoy the advantages 
of having activities carried on within a state 
to further its business interests under the 
protection of its laws .... pp. 359-360. 
Hornblower and Bear Stearns, by virtue of their registration 
with the Utah Securities Commission, are permitted to act as 
broker-dealers in Utah under the protection of its laws. 
Furthermore, all three defendants are protected in the use 
of their trade names (service marks) used in their advertis-
ing in Utah under Sec. 70-3-1 et seq., Utah Code Ann. (1953) 
in that they may file for protection thereof. Engineered 
Sports Products v. Brunswick, 362 F.Supp. 722 (D.Utah 1973), 
per Anderson, J. 
c. Other relevant matters bearing on the 
notions of fair play and justice require 
affirmance of the Trial Court. 
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(1) Registration of Hornblower and Bear 
Stearns with the Utah Securities Com-
mission and of Sutro with 30 juris-
dictions and their engaging in inter-
state commerce negates any claim of 
inconvenience or unfairness in defend-
ing in Utah. 
In Mountain States Sports v. Sharman, 353 F.Supp. 
613, 616 (D. Utah 1972), Judge Anderson construed the Utah 
long-arm statute, noting that factors going to the ultimate 
question of whether due process allowed the exercise of 
jurisdiction included "the extent to which defendants en-
gage in interstate commerce . and the general conven-
ience of defending in Utah." He then found nothing in the 
record there suggesting "hardship, injustice, or unusual in-
convenience" would result, from defending in Utah, stating the 
defendants there were engaged in interstate business dealings 
"which suggest their general ability to litigate matters out-
side of California." Likewise, all three brokers here are 
engaged in interstate business dealings. Their advertisements 
in nationally circulated periodicals highlight the interstate 
nature of their operations. Bear Stearns and Hornblower now 
are and were registered with the Utah Securities Commission 
at the time these actions were filed (as well as with the 
equivalent body in~ other states in the case of Hornblower 
and most other states in the case of Bear Stearns) and there-
by consented to service upon them through the Director of the 
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Utah Securities Commission in all matters arising under 
the Utah Uniform Securities Act. Sec. 61-1-26, Utah Code 
Ann. (1953). 
With respect to Sutro, though not registered 
as a broker-dealer in Utah, it is registered in 30 separate 
jurisdictions, including adjacent states of Arizona, Nevada, 
Colorado and Wyoming. It is thus hard to see how Sutro 
(which has also advertised extensively in national publica-
tions widely read in Utah) would be inconvenienced by having 
to defend in Utah. 
(2) The brokers knew they were dealing with 
public monies. 
All the cases relied on by the brokers involved 
the more usual contract or tort litigation between private 
parties. Here, a public entity seeks to recover damages 
resulting from state monies having been paid out unlawfully. 
In accepting and filling the scores of orders for the pur-
chase of securities involved here, the brokers must be pre-
sumed to have known that the University is a state institu-
tion supported by state monies. Thus, it is hardly unfair 
to have the brokers present their defenses in the state 
whose citizens paid over $8,600,000.00.!Q_/ for the securities, 
40/ Hornblower - $2,238,974.80 
Bear - $4,863,574.35 
Sutro - $1,497,574.00 
Source: see footnote 41, infra. 
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especially because they derived a total of well over 
$105,000.00 in commissions.~/ It requires no citation 
that the ultra vires doctrine was promulgated to protect 
the public treasury to the ultimate benefit of the tax-
payer. These suits are between the brokers and the tax-
payers of Utah, as the Trial Court repeatedly noted. 
That fact alone confers jurisdiction in accordance with 
notions of fairness under the due process clause of the 
United States Constitution, incorporated into the Utah 
long-arm statute by sec. 78-27-22. 
If the Court's ruling is that the University 
can recover damages, it follows logically that jurisdiction 
has been obtained. In Hill v. Zale, ~· Justice Crockett 
stated: 
When a foreign corporation is permitted 
to enjoy the advantages of having activities 
carried on within a state to further its busi-
ness interests under the protection of its laws, 
it is only fair and reasonable that its citizens 
have some practical means of redress if griev-
ances arise. 
In quoting the above passage, the Trial Court recognized its 
peculiar applicability to these cases. These brokers "entered 
~/ Hornblower - $32,622.43 
Bear - $35,323.59 + $34,760.33 
Sutro - $13,508.30 
Source: Bear Stearns, R. 236, 722-723; Hornblower, 
R. 449-450; Sutro, R. 84. The amounts do not 
include discounts or underwriting fees in those 
cases where the broker acted as a principal. 
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into the transactions assumingly for profits of their own 
(Memorandum Decision, Merrill Lynch, R. 396)" under the 
protection of Utah's laws. Since these cases involve tax-
payer monies (Memorandum Decision, Bear Stearns, R. 2185-
2186), it is only fair and reasonable that these taxpayers 
have some practical means of redress. 
Decision: 
(3) The brokers advertised in Utah and 
used the services of Utah banks to 
receive the stock certificates and 
to make payment for the stock. 
As Judge Christoffersen stated in his Memorandum 
All three defendants, however, ad-
vertise their operations throughout the 
United States and advertise in national 
periodicals that they are in the business 
of selling stocks, and that stocks may be 
ordered from all three defendants from 
outside the state of their place of busi-
ness. In previous cases of University vs. 
Merri 11 Lynch and Bosworth , Sul 1 i van Co . , 
who are in the State of Utah, arrangements 
were made for USU delivering drafts to a 
Logan bank. Stock certificates were placed 
with these banks, paid for by USU drafts 
from the banks. The actual placement of 
the stock certificates with Logan banks 
and their payment by USU drafts by the 
banks were made in Logan, Utah. This would 
certainly seem to be doing business in the 
State of Utah and more particularly in Cache 
County. The acts of placing the stock cer-
tificates with Logan banks, payments of 
drafts at the Logan banks for such certifi-
cates, sending confirmation slips and account 
statements to Utah, and delivering certificates 
to Utah certainly appears to be sufficient acts 
to confer jurisdiction over non-resident de-
fendants (Bear Stearns, R. 293). (Emphasis 
added.) 
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(4) The brokers solicited business from 
the University. 
Clearly the brokers all solicited (and ob-
tained) substantial business from the University. They 
all conversed frequently with Catron, either calling him 
or accepting his collect calls. Sutro invited him to 
and hosted him at two seminars for institutional customers 
and prospective customers, paying for meals, refreshments, 
and entertainment. The fact that Sutro may not have actu-
ally recommended he purchase a particular security does not 
mean that Sutro did not solicit the University's business. 
As every salesman knows, solicitation takes many forms. 
Hornblower and Bear Stearns actually recommended the Uni-
versity purchase certain securities, obviously hoping it 
would use their broker fa~ilities to make those purchases. 
That it purchased and sold securities through these three 
brokers to the tune of over $105,000.00 in commissions at-
tests to the success of their solicitation efforts. 
3. Jurisdiction is Had Under The "Doing 
Business" Test 
The "minimal contacts" test has been developed 
to a pp 1 y Utah's 1 ong-a rm statute (Utah Code Ann., Sections 
78-27-22 to 28). Preceding the passage of that Act in 1969, 
Utah Courts developed a "doing business" test for purposes 
of determining jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant 
alleged to be doing business in the State. Secs. 78-27-20, 
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21, Utah Code Ann. (1979); Rule 17(e), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Even under this older test, these brokers are 
subject to this jurisdiction. 
a. That the brokers solicited business 
from the University subjects them to 
Utah jurisdiction. 
In 1944, this Court, per Wade J., stated in 
Industrial Commission v. Kemmerer Coal Co., 150 P.2d 373, 
with reference to subjecting a nonresident corporation to 
Utah jurisdiction: 
... it would appear that very little 
more than mere solicitation is necessary to 
constitute "doing business" by a foreign cor-
poration ... 
The liberalization of in personam jurisdiction in the last 
35 years under the "doing business" test makes the Kemmerer 
Coal case more compelling authority today. The solicitation 
efforts of these brokers has jus~ been summarized. That the 
"very little more" than solicitation required in Kemmerer to 
constitute "doing business" is present in these cases requires 
no additional recitation. As already discussed, two of the 
brokers were registered in Utah. All of them received sub-
stantial commissions which came from public monies. And all 
of them delivered stock certificates to Utah banks and mailed 
confirmation slips and account statements directly to the 
University. These activities alone, coupled with the brokers' 
solicitations, clearly satisfy the "solicitation-plus" rule of 
the "doing business" test. "In Personam Jurisdiction in Utah. 
~. pp. 235-239. 
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b. The services of the Logan banks were 
frequently used by the brokers; indeed, 
the banks were their aoents as a matter 
of law. 
The University maintains that as a matter of 
law, the banks were agents of the brokers. Judge Christoffersen 
so held: 
A bank in Cache County was designated 
as an agent to receive delivered orders from 
[the brokers] and to pay for such orders in 
Cache County (Bosworth, R. 150). 
See Phelan v. University National Bank, 229 M.E.2d 374 (Ill. 1967). 
But even if the banks were not the brokers' agents in a tech-
nical legal sense, the brokers frequently and continuously 
used the banks' services which, for purposes of establishing 
jurisdiction, suffices. Remembering the language of Justice 
Crockett in Hill v. Zale, ~· the brokers fully utilized 
the services of two Uta~ banks to further their own business 
interests and thus cannot complain it would be unfair to com-
pel them to defend in Utah. 
c. The brokers' activities in the State 
were substantial and continuous. 
A significant factor in applying the "doing busi-
ness" test is whether the activities of a nonresident car-
poration were substantial and continuous. Here, the brokers' 
activities ranged from a period of six months (Sutro) to eigh-
teen months (Bear Stearns). Over eighteen months, Bear Stearns 
conducted over 72 trades for the University (Bear Stearns, R. 
236, 722-723). Over a nine-month period, Hornblower filled 
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82 University purchase orders (Hornblower, R. 449-450). 
During these extended periods of trading for the University, 
the brokers' salesmen conversed frequently and continuously 
with Catron, accepting dozens of long distance calls in the 
process.ill Throughout this time, the brokers sent a con-
firmation slip after each trade and also sent monthly account 
statements directly to the University in Utah. The brokers' 
solicitation for business within Utah was thus "continuous, 
systematic, and of long duration. 11441 
4. The Brokers' Cases Are Distinguishable. 
In Producers Livestock Loan Co. v. Miller, 580 
P.2d 603 (Utah 1978), this Court gave examples of "necessary 
and practical limitations" upon the expanded concept of long-
arm jurisdiction. One example was where a person buys stock 
in a corporation located in and carried on in another state. 
These cases, however, involve a person buying stock in dozens 
of corporations through the same broker, then suing the broker; 
they do not involve suits against the corporation issuing the 
stock as in this Court's example. 
The brokers' reliance on Foreign Study League v. 
Holland-America Line, 27 Utah 2d 442, 497 P.2d 244 (1972) is 
~/ Catron conversed long distance with Bear Stearns over 
50 times, with Hornblowers' salesmen over 100 times, 
and also with Sutro's employees numerous times (Bear 
Stearns, R. 152-153). 
~/ "In Personam Jurisdiction in Utah,"~· p. 237. 
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L 
also misplaced. That case did not turn on the fact that 
the defendant's representatives traveled to Utah on several 
occasions. Conn v. Whitmore,~-
Finally, Union Ski Co. v. Union Plastics Corp., 
548 P.2d 1257 (Utah 1976) is neither controlling nor reliable 
authority. In Union Ski, there was no continuity of activity 
as here. The defendant there had not advertised or solicited 
business from the Utah plaintiff as here. There, the con-
tract was made in California whereas here the orders were 
placed by telephone from Utah. Payments there were made in 
California; here, payments were made to Utah banks from which 
the University picked up the certificates. Finally, Union 
Ski did not involve two defendants registered with a Utah 
regulatory agency nor .a factual setting 1~here Utah tax monies 
were at stake. Parenthetically, Union Ski has been shown to 
be unreliable in several key respects. "In Personam Juris-
diction in Utah,"~· pp. 245-251. 
B. VENUE WAS PROPER IN CACHE COUNTY ON THE 
GROUND THAT THE WRONG OCCURRED THERE. 
1. Statement of Facts 
The allegations of the complaints, supplemented 
by the affidavits, establish as uncontroverted the following: 
(1) In a number of cases, some involving both brokers, 
Catron mailed from Logan checks drawn.on the University's accounts 
with Logan banks to pay for purchases. 
(2) The University's monies, which Catron used to 
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buy securities and pay commissions, were located in Logan. 
(3) In the case of both brokers, Catron often 
requested in placing orders to purchase that payment be made 
against the securities at one of two Logan banks, and the 
brokers complied. Consequently, these securities were de-
livered by the brokers herein, or their agents, to the Logan 
banks which in turn delivered them to the University in ex-
change for payment. In the case of many payment-against-
delivery orders placed with Bosworth, the Logan bank used in 
the "collection" process transmitted the funds it received 
from the University to the First National Bank of Denver, not 
to a Bosworth account in Salt Lake City (Bosworth, R. 126). 
(4) In the case of six orders to purchase placed 
by Catron with Merrill Lynch, the latter acted as principal 
(dealer), selling the securities to the University for its 
own account (Bosworth, R. 314). 
2. The Trial Court's Order 
Bosworth and Merrill Lynch argue that venue was 
improper in Cache County and appeal from the Trial Court's 
order to the contrary. The Trial Court stated, after noting 
the brokers' contention that any wrong would have been in 
that the University placed purchase orders with their Salt 
Lake City offices: 
Such an order may have been placed to 
people in the Salt Lake office but the per-
formance of the same occurred in Cache County. 
A bank in Cache County was designated as an 
agent to receive delivered orders from both 
defendants and to pay for such orders in Cache 
County out of the accounts of the University. 
-95-
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Such payments, in Cache County out of the 
University funds, would comprise the al-
leged wrongful acts. Whether or not these 
were authorized by Catron, the University's 
agent, does not go the question of venue 
since both defendants had agreed to this 
procedure and followed the same. Since 
both defendants agreed to and designated 
Cache County as the place of delivery and 
the lace of a ment, the Court holds venue 
ro erl lies in Cache Count Bosworth, R. 
150-151; emphasis added . 
It is simply not true, as Bosworth contends, 
that the above holding rested on the ground that Cache County 
was the residence of the University. 
3. Venue in Cache Count Is Pro er Under 
Utah Code Ann. Section 78-13-7 1953 
a. The wrong occurred in Cache County. 
The University relies upon that part of sec. 
78-13-7 allowing actions nqt covered by other specific venue 
provisions to be tried in the county in which the cause of 
action arises. The brokers agree that the cause of action 
arises "where the wrong occurs." 
The brokers argue, variously, that the wrong 
consisted of: 
(1) Merrill Lynch assenting to the transactions 
from its Salt Lake City office (four brokers' brief, p. 76); or 
(2) Bosworth opening an account for the Univer-
sity, accepting, transmitting and confirming all University pur-
chase orders "at or from" Bosworth's Salt Lake City office; and 
receiving all new account documents and University authoriza-
-96-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
tions at its Salt Lake City office (Bosworth brief, p. 44). 44/ 
The brokers' above analysis ignores the gravamen of these 
complaints, which is that the University paid out monies 
illegally for which it now brings suit. The ultra vires doc-
trine, which these cases invoke, was designed to prevent the 
wrongful expenditure of public money; it was only designed to 
prevent third parties from executing contracts with public 
bodies to the extent those contracts called for unlawful ex-
penditures. Thus, the wrong was not the accepting of purchase 
orders which may or may not have occurred in Sa 1 t Lake City but 
rather the accepting of the University's money--which occurred 
in Logan in the case of all payment-against-delivery orders. 
In the case of payment-against-delivery orders placed with 
Bosworth, the money never went to Salt Lake County but went 
directly from the Logan collecting bank to Denver. 
b. The collecting banks were the brokers' 
agents for purposes of venue. 
It is not necessary that the two Logan banks were 
the brokers' agents, strictly speaking, for this Court to 
affirm venue. Judge Christoffersen held them to be the 
brokers' agents, however, and if he was right no further 
inquiry is necessary. The fact that Catron initially 
chose the banks does not preclude them from being the 
44/ The key sentence of Bosworth ' s b r i e f : "A 1 1 orders for 
the purchase and sale of securities were entered by the 
University at Bosworth's Salt Lake County office and 
were accepted, transmitted and confirmed by the defen-
dant at or from its Salt Lake City office.", is not 
supported by any affidavit. 
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brokers' agents. Restatement (Second) of Agency, Section 
15, 3 Am.Jur. 2d Agency, Sections 17-18. Nor does the fact 
that the banks may have been acting simultaneously as agents 
for both the University and the brokers. 3 Am.Jur.2d Agency, 
Section 234. Under Utah commercial law, a collecting bank 
is an agent for the owner of securities. Utah Code Ann.(1953) 
Sections 70A-4-201(1), 105(d) and 104(l)(g). Under the Illi-
nois version of the Uniform Commercial Code, identical to 
Utah's in all material respects, the Illinois Supreme Court 
held a bank performing the same functions as the two Logan 
banks to be a collecting bank. Phelan v. University National 
Bank, ~- The brokers attack this holding on the ground 
the two banks were "payor" banks, not "collecting" banks. 
Their argument assumes, moreover, that the items the brokers 
sent the Logan banks were "sight drafts." The banks themselves 
convincingly demonstrated they were not payor banks and the 
i t ems not " s i g h t d r a ft s " ( ae a r S tear n s , R . 15 4 8 - 15 4 9 , 15 6 6 -
1567). Finally, it should be noted that if the University, 
after paying the Logan bank for an order of stock placed 
through the brokers and receiving the certificates, had then 
tried to stop the bank from transmitting the money on to the 
brokers, it most assuredly would have failed. Certainly, the 
banks' refusal to honor the University's instructions under 
these hypothetical facts would beinconsistentwith the banks 
being the University's agent and not the brokers' agent. 
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c. The injury occurred throughout the 
State and particularly in Cache County. 
If these actions succeed, it is because the law 
recognizes a wrong done to taxpayers throughout the State. 
Indeed, this was the foundation of Judge Christoffersen's 
decision. Logically, these actions could be brought in any 
county in the State. Certainly they are properly laid in 
Cache County, the location of the University whose monies 
have been dissipated. 
CONCLUSIGN TO PART III 
The Trial Court held that the Logan banks were 
collecting banks acting as the brokers' agents in receiving 
their stock certificates, holding them until the University 
paid for them, and transmitting the funds so collected on to 
the brokers. This holding is sound and supported by case law. 
Since each broker used the collecting banks as agents in at 
least some of its transactions, that agency alone establishes 
jurisdiction over the three nonresident brokers and alone is 
a basis for proper venue of the suits against Bosworth and 
Merrill Lynch. 
However, even if the banks were not agents for 
purposes of jurisdiction and venue, although clearly agents 
for purposes of commercial law, this Court should still affirm 
the orders below. Independent of the Trial Court's holding 
that the banks were the brokers' agents, there are sufficient 
grounds under both the Utah long-arm statute and the older 
concept of doing business to support jurisdiction over the 
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nonresident brokers; and likewise there is sufficient sup-
port for venue to be laid in Cache County where the ultra 
vi res payments 1-1ere made and accepted. 
CONCLUSION 
The central issue here is rather simple (although 
the brokers' ingenuity in devising defenses contained in two 
appellant's briefs necessitates a lengthy response). Should 
this Court follow the logic of First Equity to its inexorable 
conclusion; or should it in the name of equity carve out a 
broad exception to the principle that sound public finance 
requires private persons to ascertain the limits of a public 
body's powers. The brokers here did nothing more to ascertain 
the University's powers than in the case of a private customer--
and were further shoddy in executing trades for the University 
long before receiving written authority if, indeed, two of the 
brokers ever received such authority. To deny at least some 
measure of recovery would be to broadcast to vendors eve~ywhere 
that the State's limitations on contractual powers can be cir-
cumvented if the public monies are unlawfully disbursed fast 
enough. It would also leave the taxpayer remediless although 
he had no control over the University's actions here and cannot 
be blamed for the ultra vires payments. 
These orders should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted September 28, 1979. 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Utah Attorney General 
By CJ)~ iv. 1(~ 
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' 
FIRST EQUITY CORPORATION OF FLOR-
IDA, a Florida Corporation, Plain· 
tiff and Appellant, 
v. 
UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY, a body poll-
tic and corporate, and Donald A. Catron, 
an Individual. Defendants and Respond-
ents, 
Bear Stea.rns & Co., Bosworth-Sullivan & 
Company, Inc., et al., Amici Curiae. 
No. 13798. 
Supreme Court ot Utah. 
Dec. 23, 1975. 
Stockbroker brought action to recover 
commissions and other moneys lost as re-
sult of the refusal of state university to ac-
cept and 'pay for common stock ordered by 
university employee for the university. The 
First District Court, Cache County, VeN oy 
Christoffersen, J., gTanted summary judg-
ment for the university, and stockbroker 
appealed. The Supreme Court, Hyde, Dis-
trict Judge, held that the university did not 
have the power to purchase common stock 
with public funds in its possession; thus, 
the agreement to purchase stock and pay 
commissions was ultra vires and unenforce-
able. 
Affirmed. 
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888 Utah 544 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
I. Colleges and Universities G=>I, 6(4) 
Utah State University which is a state 
institution holds property in trust for state 
and is subject to laws of state enacted re-
lating to its purposes and government and, 
in this vein, is similar to a municipal cor-
poration which also derives its powers from 
the state and deals with public funds. 
2. Colleges and Universities ct=>6(3) 
Grant to Utah State University of the 
power to handle its own financial affairs 
did not give university authority to invest 
in common stock with public funds. Const. 
art. 10, § 4; U.C.A.1953, 53-32-2, 5.>-48-10 
(5), 53-48-20(3). 
3. Colleges and Universities ¢=6(3) 
Statute allowing public corporations, 
such as Utah State University, to invest 
funds in their possession in bonds and other 
obligations of the United States did not 
give Utah State University the power to 
purchase common stock with funds in its 
possession. U.C.A.1953, 33-1-1, 33-1-3. 
4. Appeal and Error ct:>l71(1) 
Ordinarily, an appellant cannot raise 
a theory on appeal for first time di ffercnt 
from that presented to trial court. 
5. Public Contracts e= 14 
Rules denyint recovery on an ultra 
vircs contract entered by public entity arc 
based on theory that party actually dealing 
with public entity is charged with knowl-
edge that contract is ultra vi res and unen-
forceable. 
6. Brokel'1 €=16 
Stockbroker whose customer was state 
university was chargeable with knowledge 
that university's contract to buy common 
stock with public funds was ultra vires and 
thus could not shift to seller the loss in-
curred when university refused to accept 
and pay for stock. 
7. Colleges and Universities ct:>5, 6(3) 
Agreement by Utah State University 
to purchase common stock with public 
funds in its possession and to pay com-
missions to broker was ultra vires and 
unenforceable. Const. art. 10, § 4; U.C. 
A.1953, 33-1-1, 33-1-3, 53-32-2, 53-4&-IO 
(5), 53-48-20(3). 
Norman S. Johnson, Randall P. Spack-
man and Christine :-.1:. Durham of John-
son & Spackman, Salt Lake City, for plain-
tiff and appellant. 
Vernon B. Romney, Atty. Gen., David 
L Wilkinson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake 
City, for Utah State U. 
Darwin C. Hansen, Bountiful, for Ca-
tron. 
Keith E. Taylor of Parsons, Behlc & 
Latimer, Salt Lake City, for Bear Stearns 
& Co., amici curiae. 
Harold G. Christensen of Worsley Snow 
& Christensen, Salt Lake City, for Sullivan 
& Co., amici curiae. 
HYDE, District Judge: 
This is an action brought by a stock 
broker, First Equity Corporation of Florida, 
against Utah State University (USU) and 
Donald A. Catron, formerly the Assistant 
Vice-President of Finance of Utah State 
Unive~sity, for the recovery of commissions 
and other monies lost by First Equity as a 
result of USU's refusal to accept and pay 
for certain shares of common stock which 
had been ordered by Catron for USU. 
First Equity filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment and USU filed a Cross-Motion 
for Summary Judgment based on its affir-
mative defense that the orders for the pur-
chase of stock which Catron placed on be-
half of USU were ultra vires in that USU 
had no power to purchase stock and, there· 
fore, USU had no obligation to pay for the 
stock or any commissions. 
First Equity appeals from the Trial 
Court's denial of their Motion and the 
granting of Summary Judgment to USU. 
The defendant Catron is not involved in 
the Motions or this appeal. 
USU authorized Catron to purchase se-
curities of any kind through any broker 
who was a member of any major securities 
exchange or the National Association of 
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Utah 889 
Securities Dealers. Pursuant to this au-
thority, Catron opened a special cash ac-
count with First Equity and through that 
account Catron ordered and USU received 
and accepted and paid for certain securities. 
After receiving an opinion from the Attor-
ney General's office that USU should not 
be investing in stocks, USU refused to ac-
cept delivery and pay for the stocks giving 
rise to this action. 
USU revoked Catron's authority prior 
to the purchase of the stocks in question but 
apparently neither the resolution granting 
Catron authority nor the resolution revok-
ing his authority was transmitted to First 
Equity. 
The case of The Unic·ersity of Utah v. 
The Board of Eraminers of the State of 
Utah, 4 Utah 2d 4-08, 295 P.2d 348, which 
determined the status of the University of 
Utah would be applicable to Utah State 
University. USU is a corporation and thus 
constitutes a legal entity with lir1'ited ca-
pacity. It was created and exists for the 
sole purpose of more conveniently govern-
ing and conducting the educational institu-
tion. It is a state institution, a public cor-
poration 1 not above the power of the Leg-
islature to control and is subject to the laws 
of this state from time to time enacted re-
lating to its purposes and government. 
Utah State Legislature has from time to 
time exercised control over USU and given 
USU some power of investment. The di-
rect question presented here is whether or 
not USU is empowered to invest in common 
stock with public funds. 
It is the position of First Equity and the 
Amici Brokers that USU had the power to 
invest in common stock as part of its gen-
eral power to control and supervise all ap-
propriated and donated funds. 
USU was created in 1888 (Compiled 
laws of Utah, Section 1855) and a govern-
I. "A public corporation which is not munici· 
pal ia one created by the State solely as it.9 
own device and agency . A. Stat~ 
Univenitv . . . and a State Board of 
Education constitute. if incorporated, illu.ttrcr 
tion4 of thi.t cla.t.t. Because the independent 
P<>wer of such corporations is frequently 
S4'4 P.26-56V:t 
ing Board of Trustees was established with 
the following duties and powers: 
They shall have the general control 
and supervision of the agricultural col-
lege, the farm pertaining thereto, and 
such lands as may be vested in the col-
lege by Territorial legislation, of aU ap-
propriations made by the Territory for 
the support of the same, and also of lands 
that may hereafter be donated by the Ter-
ritory or by any person or cor-
poration, in trust for the promotion of 
agricultural and industrial pursuits. 
(emphasis added) 
It is this "general control of 
all appropriations" that appellant claims 
was perpetrated in 1895 by Article X, Sec-
tion 4, of Utah Constitution, which pro-
vides: 
The location and establishment by ex-
isting laws of the University of Utah, 
and the Agricultural College are hereby 
confirmed, and all rights, immunities, 
franchises, and endowments heretofore 
granted or conferred, are hereby per-
petuated unto said University and Agri-
cultural College respectively. 
In 1929 the Legislature changed the name 
of the Agricultural College to Utah State 
Agricultural College and constituted it a 
"body politic and corporate." In 1957 the 
Legislature again changed the name, this 
time to Utah State University of Agricul-
tural and Applied Sciences. The Legisla-
ture expressly perpetuated "all rights, im-
munities, franchises, and endowments here-
tofore granted or conferred" upon the col-
lege. The statute further provided that 
USU: 
. may have and use a corporate 
seal, may sue and be sued and contract 
and be contracted with. It may take, 
hold, lease, sell and convey real and 
nominal, or small . . and their officers 
and members (if any) have no individual in· 
terest in them. these organizations are some-. 
times described . . . as public quasi cor-
porations." 1 McQuillin, Municipal Corpora-
tiO.... (1971 Rev. VG!. Section• 2.03(b) p. 
133). 
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personal property as the interests of the 
college may require. (UCA 53--32-2) 
The Higher Education Act of 1969 
(UCA 53---IS-10( 5)) states each university 
or college may do its own pur-
chasing, issue its own payroll, and handle 
its own financial affairs under the general 
supervision of the Board as provided by this 
Act. 
And in addition thereto, the 1969 Act 
specifics (UCA 53-48-20(3)): 
Any institution, college or department or 
its foundation or organization engaged in 
a program authorized by the board may: 
(c) Accept contributions, grant or gifts 
from any private organization . 
( d) Retain, accumulate, invest, commit 
and expend the funds and proceeds of 
such authorized programs 
Nothing in the Constitution or legislative 
action involving USU specifically grants 
or denies to USU the power to invest state 
appropriations in common stock. Appellant 
and Amici contend that the general control 
and supervision of all appropriations and 
the granted power to do its own purchasing, 
is sue its own payroll and handle its own fi-
nancial affairs are broad, general grants of 
power and would include the power to in-
vest in common stock in the absence of spe-
cific legislative provisions to the contrary. 
Whether or not the grant of a "general 
control" of "all appropriations" and the 
right to "handle its own financial affairs" 
grant unrestricted power to invest is an-
swered by The University r>f Utah v. Board 
of Examiners of the State of Utah (supra) 
case. After quoting Sections I and 2 of 
Article X of the Constitution which man-
dates the Legislature to provide for the 
maintenance of the University of Utah and 
USU, the Court states: 
Would it be contended by the University 
that under Article X, Section I, it might 
compel the Legislature to appropriate 
money the University considers essential? 
ls it contended that the demands of the 
University are not subject to constitution-
al debt limits? If so, respondent would 
have the power to destroy the solvency of 
the State and all other institutions by de· 
mands beyond the power of the State to 
meet. 
The Court then quotes in full Sections 
and 7 of Article X of the Constitution, 
which provides, respectively, that the pro-
ceeds of the sale of land reserved by Con-
gress for the University of Utah shall con-
stitute permanent funds of the State, and 
that all public school funds shall be guaran-
teed by the State against loss or diversion. 
Then the Court concludes: 
It is inconceivable that the framers of the 
Constitution in light of the provisions of 
Sections I, S and i of Article X and the 
provision as to debt limitations intended 
to place the University above the only 
controls available for the people of this 
State as to the property, management and 
government of the University. We arc 
unable to reconcile respondent's position 
that the University has a blank check as 
to all its funds with no. pre-audit and no 
restraint under the provisions of the Con-
stitu'tion requiring the State to safely in-
vest and hold the dedicated funds and 
making the Stale guarantor of the public 
school funds against loss or diversion. 
To hold that respondent has free and un-
controlled custody and use of its property 
and funds while making the State guar-
antee said funds against loss or diversion 
is inconceivable. We believe the framers 
of the Constitution intended no such re-
sult. (emphasis added) 
[ l J As stated above, it is clear since The 
University of Utah v. Board of Examiners 
of the State of Utah (supra) case that USU 
is clearly a state institution and that it holds 
property in trust for the State of Utah and 
is subject to the laws of the State enacted 
relating to its purposes and government. In 
this vein it would be similar to a municipal 
corporation which also derives its powers 
from the State and deals with public funds. 
The approach of common law in inter-
preting legislative grants of power to public 
bodies concerning the handling of public 
monies is illustrated by National S11rety v. 
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county treasurer under a statute empower- 820, citing numerous cases: 
ing him to sell bonds initially purchased "\I/here a statute coniers certain spe-
with county sinking funds, had power to re- cific powers, those not enumerated are 
invest the proceeds of sale in similar bonds. withheld. [n other words, enumera-
In holding that he did not, the Court stated: lion of powers operates to exclude 
It seems certain that, in the absence such as are not enumerated." (em-
of statutory authority to invest the sink- phasis added) 
ing funds in his hands, it was the duty 
of the county treasurer to preserve the 
sinking funds which came into his of-
ficial hands intact in money. Before the 
custodian of the sinking fund could in-
vest such funds in any manner, he must 
be able to put his finger upon some ex-
press statutory provision which would 
authorize the investment. 
This Court has held that municipal pow: 
ers cannot lightly be inferred by implication. 
In Moss v. Board of Commissioners, l Utah 
2d 60, 261 P.2d 961 (1953) it was said: 
This Court has not favored the exten-
sion of the power of the city by implica-
tion, and the only modification of such 
doctrine is where the power is one which 
is necessarily implied. Unless this re-
quirement is met, the power cannot be 
deduced from any consideration of con-
venience or necessity, or d~$irability of 
such result, and no doubtf~l inference 
from other powers granted or from am-
biguous or uncertain provisions of the 
law would be sufficient to sustain such 
authority. 
A tendency to narrowly interpret grants 
of legislative power to municipalities is also 
seen in Tott.,. of Worland v. O'Dell and 
Johnson, 79 Wyo. l, 329 P.2d 797 (1958): 
all the courts, without a single 
exception so far as we know, agree that 
a municipality has only such powers as 
arc granted to it by the legislature. That 
itself seems to mean that a power not 
granted is a power prohibited. As stated 
2. The State Legislature has taken an interest 
in investments by state agencies and regulated 
"industries". 
l:tah State Retirement Board, UCA 49-9-12 
Fiduciaries, UCA 7-5-11 
Utah Rep. 54J-55J ? 2d-5 
[Z] A general grant to handle its finan-
cial affairs does not give authority to invest 
in common stock. The power to invest is 
not granted in the absence of legislation 
to the contrary but the reverse is true. It 
depends upon a specific authorizing grant 
of such power. 
The only specific Utah statute on the sub-
ject of investment of USU would be Section 
33-1-1.2 Section 33-1-1 is a one sentence 
paragraph containing over .+SO words, but 
the basic structure is: Investments by 
(named parties) of their own funds or 
f~·ds in their possession (in specified se-
curities) shall be lawful. The "named par-
ties" include "any private, political or pub-
lic corporation or person" and 
its provisions and meaning would apply to 
USU as a public corporation as well as pri-
vate persons and private corporations. The 
"specified securities" enumerated are all 
government guaranteed securities such as 
"bonds and other obligations of 
the United States." The stocks in question 
in this lawsuit do not fall within enumerat-
ed securities set forth in that section. 
Section 33-1-3 which was enacted as part 
of the same act in 19~9 as Section 33-1-1 
provides in relevant part : 
The provisions of this act are supple-
mental to any and all other laws relat-
ing to and declaring what shall be legal 
investments for the persons, corporations, 
organizations and officials referred to in 
this act . • (emphasis added) 
Insurallce Companie•, l:CA 31-13-1 et seq. 
Department of Finan~. L'Ca 63-2--34 
State Land Board, UCA 6:>-1--65 (pr..,ent 
statute) 
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(3) Section 33--1-1 is simply a declara-
tion that investments in specified securities 
are lawful. Without prohibiting any other 
investments or reqt•iring only the listed in-
vestments, the Legislature declared that cer-
tain investments were lawful. It is appar-
ent that in enacting Section 33--1-3 the 
Legislature envisioned situations where the 
"named parties" mentioned in Section 33--
1-1 might be empowered to invest in secur-
ities of a type not enumerated in Section 
33-1-1.l Further, the language of Section 
33--1-3 quoted above was worded to include 
within its meaning any laws which the 
Legislature might enact thereafter. Sub-
sequent to the enactment of Section 33-1-3, 
the Legislature has enacted statutory defi-
nitions of what arc legal investments for 
some state agencies and regulated "indus-
tries".' However, no other statute enacted 
prior or subsequent to L939 defines speci-
fically what type of securities USU may 
legally invest in. It must be concluded, 
therefore, that USU had no specific desig-
nated power from the Constitution or the 
Legislature to invest its funds in securities 
outside those declared lawful by 33-1-1 
and investments in common stock arc ultra 
vires acts. 
\¥hat, then, is the effect of an ultra vires 
contract by a public corporation? 
In News Advocate Publishing Co. v. Car-
bon County, 72 Utah 88, 269 P. 12'> (1928), 
the Carbon County Oerk caused to be pub-
lished in plaintiff newspaper a Notice of 
Sale of Property on which taxes were de-
linquent. Defendant County, on receiv-
ing the publication bill, refused payment on 
the basis that the contract was ultra vires 
because the County Commissioners had no 
statutory power to authorize such a publi-
cation as the one therein involved. There-
in this Court said: 
The general principle or rule of law 
that municipal corporations are not bound 
3. In 1939 when Sections 33-1-1 and 33-1-3 
were enacted, the State Land Board already 
possessed statutory power to invest its funds 
in securities not enumerated in Section 33-1-
1, e. g., "state, county, city or school district 
bonds". 
by contracts made without authority or 
in excess of the power of such corpora-
tions is conceded. The rule applicahle is 
stated in 15 C.]. 540 as follows: 
"A County is not bound by a con-
tract beyond the scope of its power or 
foreign to its purposes, or which is out-
side of the authority of the officers 
making it. In this connection it is the 
rule that the authority of a county 
board to make contracts is strictly lim-
ited to that conferred, either expressly 
or impliedly, by statute, regardless of 
benefit to the county or of value re-
ceived; and the same is true as to 
other county officers attempting to 
contract on behalf of the county. 
* * All persons dealing with 
officers or agents of counties are 
bound to ascertain the limits of their 
authority or power as fixed by stat-
utory or organic law, and are charge-
able with knowledge of such limits. 
No estoppel can be created by the acts 
of such agents or officers in excess 
of lheir statutory or constitutional 
powers." 
J:or further authority for the proposition 
that "one who deals with a municipal corpo-
ration does so at his peril" see Tlia.tcher 
Chemical Co. v. Sall Lake City Corporation, 
21 Utah 2d 355, 455 P.2d i69 ( 1968) and 
cases cited therein. 
If the enforcement of this rule at tim.s 
appears harsh, it is a matter for the State 
Legislature to correct. 
(~) Although this action was com-
menced and argued at the lower Court on 
the basis of breach of contract between the 
parties, plaintiff and Amici now contend 
that in any event plaintiff should be en-
titled to recover because they were acting 
as the agents of USU.5 Under the theory 
of agency, one of two things would occur; 
4. See Footnote 2 above. 
5. Orc.lioarily, an appellant rannot raise a 
theory on appeal for the fin1t time different 
from that presented to the Court below. 
Davi• v. lfulholland, 25 Utah 2d 56, 475 P.2d 
834 (1970). 
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either the loss would have to be absorbed 
by the seller of the stocks who doesn't have 
the faintest idea that his stock is being pur-
chased by a public corporation or the rules 
denying recovery on ultra vires contracts 
of a public corporation would be meaning-
less. Substantive rights involving public 
funds should not be determined by the cus-
tom of the securities industry in designat-
ing the broker as the agent of the buyer or 
as agent of the buyer and seller. The rules 
denying recovery of an ultra vires contract 
are based on the theory that the party actu-
ally dealing with the public entity is charged 
with the knowledge that the contract is 
ultra vires and unenforceable, and in this 
case the plaintiff is the party actually deal-
ing with the public entity and this action 
was filed on that basis-that USU was a 
customer of First Equity. 
[7] USU had no power to enter into an 
agreement for the purchase of common 
stock and the agreement to purchase and 
pay commissions thereon. are ultra vires 
agreements and unenforceable. 
The Trial Court's granting of Summary 
Judgment to USU is affirmed. 
No costs awarded. 
HENRIOD, C. J., and ELLETT, 
CROCKETT, and TUCKETT, JJ., concur. 
MAUGHAN, J., does not participate 
herein. 
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